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Abstract
How large economic stimuli generate individual and aggregate responses is a central
question in economics, but has not been studied experimentally. We provided one-time
cash transfers of about USD 1000 to over 10,500 poor households across 653 random-
ized villages in rural Kenya. The implied fiscal shock was over 15 percent of local GDP.
We find large impacts on consumption and assets for recipients. Importantly, we docu-
ment large positive spillovers on non-recipient households and firms, and minimal price
inflation. We estimate a local fiscal multiplier of 2.7. We interpret welfare implications
through the lens of a simple household optimization framework.
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Tracing out the pattern of transactions in an integrated economy, and their contribution
to aggregates of interest like overall output or to well-being, has long been a central task
of economic analysis. For instance, there has been interest in understanding the aggregate
impacts of fiscal stimulus and cash infusions for decades (Keynes 1936), and a growing body
of empirical evidence from rich countries shows that fiscal multipliers are positive and large,
based on non-experimental variation generated by policy changes (Chodorow-Reich 2019;
Nakamura and Steinsson 2014; Auerbach, Gorodnichenko, and Murphy 2019). Until now,
however, these issues have not been subjected to experimental examination.
There is also renewed interest in related topics in development economics with the rise
of large-scale cash transfer programs, which have now been implemented in scores of low
and middle income countries.1 A large literature on the impacts of these transfers has devel-
oped, employing well-identified experimental and quasi-experimental designs. These studies
have documented effects on a broad range of behavioral responses, including consumption,
earnings, assets, food security, child growth and schooling, self-reported health, female em-
powerment, and psychological well-being (e.g., Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) and Baird,
McIntosh, and Ozler (2011); see Bastagli et al. (2016) for a review). Yet there is limited
evidence on the aggregate economic impacts or welfare consequences of such policies, as the
literature has typically focused on documenting impacts on treated households’ behavior and
has rarely assessed spillover or aggregate consequences (for exceptions, see Angelucci and
De Giorgi (2009), Bobonis and Finan (2009), Cunha, De Giorgi, and Jayachandran (2018),
and Filmer et al. (2018)).
The present study was prospectively designed to unite these two disparate literatures
by studying the aggregate impacts of large cash stimulus programs experimentally. We
designed and carried out a large-scale experiment in rural Kenya that provided one-time
cash transfers worth roughly USD 1000 (distributed by the NGO GiveDirectly) to over
10,500 poor households in a sample of 653 villages with a population of roughly 300,000.
The implied fiscal shock was large, as the cash transfers amounted to over 15% of local GDP
during the peak 12 months of the program.
Beyond its fiscal scale, at least three aspects of the project represent advances on ex-
isting work. First, we generated substantial spatial variation in the intensity of transfers
by deliberately randomizing the allocation of cash transfers not just across households or
villages (as is typical), but also across geographic sublocations (groups of 10–15 villages),
thereby increasing power to detect aggregate impacts. Second, we carried out unusually
extensive original data collection, giving us greater visibility into the chain of causal effects
1. 97% of developing countries in Europe, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa have some type of cash
transfer program (World Bank 2017).
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linking cash transfers to aggregate outcomes in a complex and interconnected economy. Our
household and enterprise censuses of the study area count 65,385 households and 12,095 non-
farm enterprises. Within this unusually large sampling frame, we gathered detailed panel
(longitudinal) data on household receipt of the transfer; household consumption expenditure
patterns (representative for both treated and untreated households); local enterprise produc-
tion, employment and revenue; labor market conditions; as well as especially high-frequency
(monthly) and spatially disaggregated market data on prices. Third, we interpret the results
through the lens of a theoretical framework which helps clarify which quantities and prices
are likely to generate first-order impacts on welfare in this setting. We are then able to assess
these effects empirically using the rich dataset.
Following earlier studies, we first document large direct impacts on households that
received transfers, including increases in consumption expenditures and holdings of durable
assets eighteen months after the start of transfers. We do not observe meaningful changes
in total labor supply among treated households.
We then turn to data from detailed surveys of local enterprises. Enterprises in areas that
receive more cash transfers also experience meaningful gains in total revenues, in line with the
increases in household expenditure. Interestingly, sales increased without noticeable changes
in firm investment behavior (beyond a modest increase in inventories), and sales do not
increase differentially for firms owned by cash recipient households relative to non-recipients.
Both patterns suggest a demand-led rather than an investment-led expansion in economic
activity. Increased enterprise revenue in turn translates into a moderate increase in the wage
bill paid to workers by local firms and a modest increase in overall profits. Methodologically,
one important feature of the enterprise (and to a lesser extent household) results is that they
are largely driven by the overall intensity of treatment in nearby communities, as opposed
to the treatment status of the village in which the enterprise is located alone. This suggests
that common study designs which aim to identify spillover effects by clustering treatment at
the village level and assuming no spillovers across villages may be mis-specified, at least in
densely populated areas such as the one we study.2
We next examine how these changes affect untreated households. Despite not receiving
transfers, they too exhibit large consumption expenditure gains: their annualized consump-
tion expenditure is higher by 13% eighteen months after transfers began, an increase roughly
comparable to the gains contemporaneously experienced by the treated households. This re-
sult contrasts with earlier suggestive evidence of negative consumption and psychological
spillovers from cash transfers within villages (Haushofer, Reisinger, and Shapiro 2019). In-
creased spending is not financed by dissaving, but more likely results in part from the income
2. For example, households are located within 2 km of seven other villages on average.
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gains experienced by local firms’ owners and workers. Indeed, non-recipients’ income gain is
driven largely by increases in wage labor earnings, consistent with the fact that enterprise
wage bills increase. In a reassuring check, the magnitude of per capita consumption gains
(per dollar transferred) experienced by local households lines up roughly with the per capita
revenue gains documented among local firms. On some level, this result should be unsur-
prising since the documented increase in local consumption expenditures needs to be spent
somewhere; our contribution is to carefully document how such spending spreads locally
through a low-income economy.
A further central issue is the extent to which transfers affect local prices (as for exam-
ple Cunha, De Giorgi, and Jayachandran (2018) show in Mexico), and thus the extent to
which the effects described above are nominal or real. We study this question through careful
monthly measurement of prices for scores of local commodities, consumer goods, and durable
goods, as well as prices for inputs like labor and capital. For inputs, we find positive point
estimates, but they are not always statistically significant. For outputs, we document sta-
tistically significant, but economically minimal, local price inflation. Average price inflation
is 0.1%, and even during periods with the largest transfers, estimated price effects are less
than 1% and precisely estimated across all categories of goods.
We next ask what these effects imply for the aggregate level of economic activity. We
compute a local fiscal multiplier, taking advantage of the fact that we observe the consump-
tion expenditures of representative samples of both treated and untreated households, as well
as investment by local firms. Using this expenditure-based approach, we estimate a local fis-
cal multiplier of 2.5. A dual income-based approach, relying on distinct and complementary
measures of labor and capital income, enterprise profits, and taxes, yields a similar estimate
of 2.8. These estimates are somewhat larger than (though not statistically distinguishable
from) recent multiplier estimates derived from US policy variation, which often range from
1.5-2.0 (Chodorow-Reich 2019). They are also somewhat larger than those from a structural
simulation exercise, which predicted that local income multipliers from cash transfers in ru-
ral Kenya could range from 1.6 to 1.9 (Thome et al. 2013), and are similar in magnitude to
non-experimental estimates from a cash transfer program in Mexico, which range from 1.5
to 2.6 (Sadoulet, Janvry, and Davis 2001).
Thus, a further contribution of this study is to exploit a randomized experiment to
estimate an important macroeconomic quantity (see Muralidharan and Niehaus (2017) for
a related discussion). A methodological strength of our approach is the fact that transfers
came from donors outside the study area, rather than being internally debt-financed; the
latter is typically the case in the US programs studied, and may complicate the interpretation
of consumption responses due to Ricardian equivalence issues. One weakness, on the other
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hand, is that we observe limited data in the months immediately following the transfers in
some communities, which limits the precision of our estimates.
In section 6, we interpret the welfare implications of our results using a simple theoret-
ical framework. It describes an optimizing household that experiences direct benefits from
transfers it receives, and also indirect welfare changes to the extent that the influx of pur-
chasing power into the economy induces changes either in its budget set (through changes
in income or prices) or in behaviors of other households that generate externalities (such
as crime, the provision of public goods, etc.). We also characterize, under some additional
assumptions, the wedge between welfare as defined by equivalent variation and as measured
by expenditure, a commonly-used proxy for well-being in the development literature.3
Interpreted through this lens, the results generally suggest that non-recipients were made
better off by an expansion in their budget sets: their incomes and consumption increase
without a corresponding increase in total labor supply or local consumer goods prices, and
without evidence of dissaving. Turning to externalities, we find either positive or null effects,
but no negative effects, on domestic violence; child education, nutrition and health; crime;
and public goods, as well as measures of subjective well-being. This result suggests that
concerns about cash transfer programs doing harm to non-recipients are not borne out in
our setting. One possible exception, to the extent households have preferences over their
relative socioeconomic standing, is inequality: we estimate that positive spillovers were so
large that village-level inequality might have slightly increased on some measures, despite
the fact that transfers were initially targeted to the relatively poor.
The constellation of empirical findings raises an intriguing question about how the econ-
omy absorbed such a large shock to aggregate demand. Real output increased, and yet there
is at most limited evidence of increases in the employment of land (which is in fixed supply),
labor, or capital. One plausible, albeit speculative, possibility is that the utilization of these
factors was “slack” in at least some enterprises (Lewis 1954). This seems plausible because in
the retail and manufacturing sectors, where output responses were concentrated, the typical
firm has a single employee (i.e., the proprietor), suggesting that integer constraints may often
bind. In addition, many enterprises operate “on demand” in the sense that they produce
only when they have customers, and the average non-agricultural enterprise sees just 1.7
customers per hour. In addition to retail, much manufacturing in this setting is on demand;
for example, a mill owner waits for customers to bring grain and then grinds it for them.
The existence of slack may help account for the large multiplier we document, as has also
recently been argued in US data, especially in poorer US regions (Michaillat and Saez 2015;
Murphy 2017).
3. Specifically, we follow the sufficient statistics approach of Chetty (2009) and others.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the study design,
including the cash transfer intervention. Section 2 describes data collection and estimation
methods for households, enterprises and prices. Section 3 presents results tracing out the
path of the cash through the economy. Section 4 describes the fiscal multiplier methodology
and results. Section 5 presents results for key non-market outcomes (such as subjective
well-being and health) and externalities, including crime and public goods. We lay out a
household optimization framework for understanding welfare effects in Section 6. Section 7
discusses firm production and how we can make sense of the supply-side of our results. The
final section concludes.
1 Study design
1.1 Setting: rural western Kenya
The study took place within three continguous subcounties of Siaya County, a rural area in
western Kenya bordering Lake Victoria. The population in Siaya is predominantly Luo, the
second largest ethnic group in Kenya, and while rural is also relatively densely populated,
with 395 people per km2 compared to a Kenyan average of 91. The main national road
running from the port of Mombasa to Nairobi and on to Kampala, Uganda passes through
the study area, likely helping to integrate it into the national, regional and global economy.
The NGO GiveDirectly (GD) selected the study area based on its high poverty levels.
Within this area, GD selected for expansion villages that were rural (i.e., not located in
peri-urban areas) that it had not previously worked in.4 This yielded a final sample of 653
villages spread across 84 sublocations (the administrative unit above a village). The mean
village consists of 100 households, and the average household had 4.3 members, of which 2.3
were children. 97 percent of households were engaged in agriculture; 60 percent were also
engaged in wage work and 45 percent in self-employment. The average survey respondent
was 48 years old and had about 6 years of schooling.
Transfers and data collection took place from mid-2014 to early 2017, a period of relative
economic prosperity and political stability in Kenya. The World Bank reports annual per
capita GDP growth rates ranged between 2.4 to 3.4 percent. All data collection concluded
months prior to the August 2017 national election.
4. The listing of villages was based on the 2009 National Population Census; enumeration areas (which
typically correspond to a single village) were treated as villages by GD and this study.
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1.2 Intervention: The GiveDirectly (GD) Cash Transfer Program
GD provides unconditional cash transfers to poor households in low-income countries. For
the purpose of this study, to be eligible for transfers, households had to live in homes with
thatched roofs, a simple means-test for poverty. In treatment villages, GD enrolled all
households that met this thatched-roof eligibility criterion (“eligible” households) as classified
by their field staff through a village census, and confirmed via two additional visits to eligible
households to complete the enrollment process (see Appendix B.1 for details).
Approximately one-third of all households were eligible. These households received a
series of three transfers totaling KES 87,000, or USD 1,871 PPP (USD 1,000 nominal), via the
mobile money system M-Pesa, which is widely used in Kenya. (Registering for M-Pesa was a
prerequisite for receiving transfers; households without a mobile phone were given the option
to purchase one from GD staff with the cost deducted from their transfer.) Households were
able to select the member they wished to receive the transfers. The total transfer is large,
corresponding to 75 percent of mean annual household expenditure in recipient households.
In aggregate, the transfers made in this study are equivalent to approximately 17 percent of
annual GDP (based on our data described below) in the treated areas during the peak 12
months of disbursements, and to 24 percent of annual GDP during the full 24 month rollout
period. Although small in relation to overall Kenyan GDP in 2015 (ă0.1%), locally this is
a larger relative shock than most government transfer programs, e.g., the ARRA programs
studied in the recent US stimulus bill fiscal multiplier literature, see Chodorow-Reich (2019).
Transfers were made in a series of three payments as follows: a token transfer of KES
7,000 (USD 151 PPP) was sent once a majority of eligible households within the village had
completed the enrollment process, followed two months later by the first large installment of
KES 40,000 (USD 860 PPP). Six months later (and eight months after the token transfer), the
second and final large installment of KES 40,000 was sent.The transfers were non-recurring,
i.e., no additional financial assistance was provided to recipient households after their final
large transfer, and they were informed of this up front. Households in control villages did
not receive transfers.
1.3 Experimental design
To identify spillovers both within and across villages, we employed a two-level randomization
design; Figure 1, Panel A illustrates the design. First, we randomly assigned sublocations in
our study area (or in some cases, groups of sublocations) to high or low saturation status,
resulting in 33 high saturation groups of villages, and 35 low saturation groups. Within high
(low) saturation groups, we then randomly assigned two-thirds (one-thirds) of villages to
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treatment status. Within treatment villages, all eligible households received a cash transfer.5
This design induces variation in treatment intensity across space due both to (i) the variation
in sublocation treatment intensity, and (ii) random variation in the location of treated villages
within sublocations. Figure 2 illustrates: there is considerable variation across, but also
within, sublocations in terms of the number of treated villages neighboring any given village.6
The most appropriate method for estimating effects depends on the nature of spillovers
(Baird et al. 2018). Comparing high versus low saturation sublocations is most appropriate
if most spillovers occur within the administrative boundaries of sublocations, for instance, if
there was re-allocation of effort across villages by public officials within the sublocation, or
if households rarely interact with individuals outside their sublocation. On the other hand,
a geographic model of spillovers makes most sense if distance is the most salient feature for
economic and social interactions, regardless of underlying administrative boundaries. Given
the fact that the sublocation boundaries are not “hard” in any sense in Kenya, do not
reflect salient ethnic or social divides here, and that our data indicate that there is extensive
economic interaction in nearby markets regardless of whether or not it is located in the same
sublocation, we generally prefer estimating spatial spillovers based on the amount of cash
distributed within various radii bands around one’s village. The proximity of treatment
and control villages also highlights the plausibility of cross-village spillovers, even across
sublocation boundaries.
2 Data and empirical specifications
We conducted four types of surveys: household surveys, enterprise surveys, market price
surveys, and surveys of local public goods provision. Results from the public goods surveys
are presented primarily in a separate paper (Walker 2018), and discussed briefly here. We
filed several pre-analysis plans covering the data and analyses collected as part of this project.
This paper focuses on primary outcomes for households, enterprises and prices, and we note
where we go beyond these plans; for more details, see Appendix G.
2.1 Household data
We first conducted a baseline household census in all villages, which serves as a sampling
frame and classifies household eligibility status. The census was designed to mimic GD’s
censusing procedure but was conducted by independent (non-GD) enumerators across both
treatment and control villages for consistency. Throughout this paper, we base our analysis
5. The randomization was conducted in two batches based on GD’s expansion plans (Appendix B.2).
6. Figure B.1 provides a higher-resolution example for two villages.
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on village membership, household definitions and eligibility as classified by our project data
collection field staff. In all, the census identified 65,385 households with a total baseline
population of 280,000 people in study villages.
We conducted baseline household surveys within one to two months after the census
and before the distribution of any transfers to a village (Figure 1, Panel B).7 We used
census information to sample at random eight eligible and four ineligible households per
village to target for surveys. When households contain a married or cohabiting couple, we
randomly selected one of the partners as the target survey respondent. Due to time and
budget constraints, we sought to complete all baseline household surveys in a single day.
If a household on our sampling list was not available on that day, we instead surveyed a
randomly-selected replacement household with the same eligibility status.
We conducted a total of 7,848 baseline household surveys between September 2014 and
August 2015.8 The survey contained detailed modules on economic activities, asset owner-
ship, psychological well-being, health and nutrition. A large array of baseline characteristics
appear balanced across treatment and control villages, with the exception of an indicator
for scoring above the median on a psychological well-being index (Table C.2, column 2, in
Appendix C.2).
Endline household survey data was collected between 9 and 31 months after each house-
hold’s “experimental start date,” meaning the month in which transfers were expected to
start in a village assigned to treatment, regardless of their actual treatment timing.9 The
5th/95th percentiles of timing ranged from 12 to 27 months, and the median survey was
conducted 19 months after the experimental start month, or about 11 months after the
distribution of the last lump sum transfer (Figure 1, Panel B).
Endline household surveys targeted all households on our initial sampling lists (including
those that were missed at baseline), along with replacement households that were surveyed
at baseline. For households that had been surveyed at baseline, we attempted to survey the
individual who was the baseline respondent. We conducted a total of 8,242 endline household
surveys between May 2016 and June 2017.10 We achieved high tracking rates at endline,
7. In a few cases, baseline surveys were conducted before the distribution of transfers but after GD had
held meetings in the village informing households that it would be a treatment village.
8. Of this total, 6,510 households were on the initial sampling list, and 1,338 were randomly-selected
replacement households.
9. The order in which villages were visited by GD and the research team was randomized within subcoun-
ties. We calculate the start and end months of when GD started transfers to villages within a subcounty,
and then, across these months, evenly assign both treatment and control villages experimental start months
based on the random ordering.
10. This includes 7,019 initially sampled and 1,223 replacement households. Of the initially sampled house-
holds, 1,015 had been missed at baseline. Our main analysis focuses on the “initially sampled” (which includes
those missed at baseline) and “replacement” households; results are similar using only originally sampled
9
reaching over 90 percent of eligible and ineligible households in both treatment and control
villages, and these rates do not systematically vary by treatment status (Table C.1). The
only subgroup difference of note is that we are slightly less likely to find ineligible households
in high saturation sublocations that were initially surveyed at baseline; more information on
tracking and attrition is in Appendix C.2.
In addition to the modules collected at baseline, endline surveys also collected more
detailed data on household expenditures and crop production, additional psychological scales
(in particular, related to stress and hope), and female respondents surveyed by a female
enumerator were also administered a module on female empowerment and gender-based
violence; we describe these measures in more detail when discussing results.
2.2 Empirics: recipient households
If the general equilibrium effects of transfers were contained within administrative units
(here, villages and sublocations), then an appropriate specification would be
yivs “ α1Treatv ` α2HighSats ` δ1yivs,t“0 ` δ2Mivs ` εivs, (1)
where yivs is an outcome of interest for household i in village v in sublocation s.
11 Treatv
is an indicator for residing in a treatment village at baseline, and HighSats an indicator
for being in a high-saturation sublocation. Here α1 captures the total average treatment
effect for households in treatment versus control villages, including both the direct effect of
treatment (for eligible households) and any within-village spillovers; note that our design does
not allow us to identify these separately. α2 is a relatively coarse way to assess cross-village
spillovers, as it does not utilize all experimental variation. We include the baseline value of
the outcome variable (yivs,t“0), when available, to improve statistical precision (McKenzie
2012).12 We cluster standard errors at the village level, and weight observations by inverse
sampling probabilities to be representative of the population of eligible households.
Overall, we view Equation 1 as a useful benchmark but unlikely to capture well the
spatial variation in treatment intensity evident in Figure 2. To better capture spillovers,
we estimate models in which an (eligible) household’s outcomes depend on the amount of
households (available upon request).
11. When we examine individual-level outcomes using Equation (1), we define treatment status and eligi-
bility on the basis of the household in which the individual lives.
12. For observations where the baseline value is missing, we include an indicator variable equal to one
denoting a missing value (Mivs), and set the baseline value of the outcome variable equal to its mean.
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money distributed in its own village and in other geographically proximate villages:
yiv “ α ` βAmtv `
Rÿ
r“0
βrAmt v,r ` δ1yiv,t“0 ` δ2Miv ` εiv. (2)
The novel terms here are the amount Amtv of cash transferred to one’s own village v over the
entire study, and the amount Amt v,r of cash transferred to villages other than v in a series of
bands with inner radius r km and outer radius r`2 km. We normalize both to be measured
as a share of per-capita GDP.13 The Amt variables depend on both the random assignment
of villages to treatment and also on the endogenous share of households in those villages
eligible for transfers, so we instrument for them using the own-village treatment indicator
Treatv and the share s
e,t v,r of eligible households in each band assigned to treatment. To
account for spatial correlation, we calculate standard errors using a uniform kernel up to 10
km (Conley 1999; 2008).14
Because we had no a priori knowledge of the relevant distances over which general equi-
librium effects might operate, we pre-specified an approach in which we first estimate a
series of nested models varying the outer limit R of the spatial bands from 2 km to 20 km in
steps of 2 km, and then select the one which minimized the Schwartz Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC). We report estimates of Equation (2) using the selected outer limit R¯. As it
turns out, this algorithm selects only the innermost 0–2 km band for almost all outcomes.15
Equation (2) correctly identifies the overall effects of the intervention if treatment inten-
sity within bands less than R¯ distance is a sufficient statistic for household i’s outcomes.
In particular, this implies that transfers delivered outside the radius R¯ have no effect on i.
If this assumption is violated – if, for example, all households were affected to some extent
by all transfers in the study area – then the effects we estimate are relative to these “ambi-
ent” effects. The fact that our design generates substantial variation in treatment intensity,
including some areas with minimal local transfers, helps to partially address this concern:
transfers in the 2 km buffer around each village range from 0 to 26% of GDP, with a 10-90
percentile range of [4%, 15%]. Even in the 4 to 6 km buffer, the 10-90 percentile range
remains wide, at [3%, 10%]. Together with the fact that our algorithm suggests spillovers
are highly localized (we select only the 2 km buffer in the vast majority of cases), this sug-
13. We use an expenditure-based measure of GDP that is described in Section 4, which we convert to a
per-capita measure based on household census data from our study area, and augmented with 2009 Kenya
National Population Census data when necessary. Per capita GDP in low saturation control villages is 641
USD PPP (or 2744 USD PPP per household); see Appendix B.3 for details.
14. We also conduct Fisher randomization tests for all specifications, where we re-randomize cash transfers
across sublocations, villages as well as their roll-out over time exactly as in our experiment and test for the
sharp null that effects are zero. Conclusions remain robust to this alternative method of inference.
15. Results are robust to adjusting inference to account for this model selection step, as described below.
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gests that a subset of our villages can reasonably serve as “pure controls.” We also typically
estimate spillovers of the same ‘sign’ as the direct effects, which suggests that any remaining
bias in our estimates likely leads us to understate, rather than overstate, overall effects. All
told, we view the problem of estimating spatial effects as unlikely to admit a perfect solu-
tion, but believe that our study design and econometric specification allow us to advance
meaningfully relative to existing work.
An overall goal is to estimate the total effect of treatment, that is, how each unit’s
outcomes differ from what they would have been had there been no intervention. As a
benchmark, we first report estimates of α1 from Equation (1), which is the total treatment
effect if all spillovers are contained within villages (a common identifying assumption). Next,
we calculate the average total effects on eligible households implied by Equation (2), mul-
tiplying the estimated coefficients by the average values of the regressors. Concretely, we
calculate the average total effect on the treated as βˆ ¨`ĘAmtv|i is a treated eligible˘`řRr“0 βˆr ¨`ĘAmt v,r|i is a treated eligible˘ for all radii bands up to the selected R¯. This second effect
allows for across-village spillovers in addition to direct effects and within-village spillovers.16
2.3 Empirics: non-recipient households
We use an analogous approach to estimate total effects on untreated households, which
include both eligible households in control villages and ineligible households in all villages.
Specifically, we estimate
yiv “ α `
Rÿ
r“0
β1rAmtr `
Rÿ
r“0
β2r pAmtr ¨ Eligivq ` γEligiv ` yiv,t“0 ¨ δ ` εiv. (3)
This specification modifies Equation (2) as follows. First, because non-recipients do not ex-
perience direct effects, we no longer separate own-village effects and across-village spillovers:
we drop Amtv and replace Amt v,r with Amtr, so that spillovers work entirely through β1r
and β2r . Second, we include an indicator for eligibility status and its interaction term with
amounts to allow for spillovers to differ by eligibility status (recall that eligible households in
control villages are untreated). As above, we instrument for Amtr using the share of eligible
households in the corresponding band assigned to treatment. When available, we include the
baseline value of the outcome variable interacted with eligibility status. We then report the
16. We also consider the possibility that effects are non-linear in the per-capita amounts transferred. Specif-
ically, Figure A.1 presents non-linear estimates of equation 2 for total consumption and firm revenue, key
summary measures of local economic activity. We cannot formally reject linearity of these outcomes with
respect to treatment intensity, and the relationships are visually roughly linear. We conduct the same test
for our 10 pre-specified primary outcomes and eligible / ineligible households separately, and cannot reject
linearity at the 10% significance level for any of them.
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average total effect on the untreated as a population-weighted average of effects for eligible
and ineligible households.17
2.4 Enterprise data
We employ several complementary sources of data on enterprises. First, we use detailed agri-
cultural and self-employment modules from the household surveys. The agriculture module
covers crop-by-crop agricultural production, sales, employment, and input costs; the self-
employment module covers revenues, profits, hours worked, and some costs and investments
for enterprises run by household members. These data are representative of enterprises
owned locally (i.e., by residents of the study area) and allow us to clearly attribute profits
to their residual claimants. They do not capture enterprises owned by people living outside
the study area, which we capture separately through the enterprise census and surveys.
Specifically, we conducted censuses and surveyed a representative subset of all non-farm
enterprises at both baseline and endline. We conducted the baseline enterprise census on
the same day as the household census. The baseline household census included a question
on whether the household was running an enterprise from their homestead or from a fixed
kiosk/shop. The enterprise census targeted enterprises operating outside of homesteads. We
then returned to survey enterprises operating outside of the homestead and open on the day
of our visit, coincident with baseline household surveys. In villages with over 20 enterprises
operating outside of homesteads, e.g., those that overlapped a market center, we randomly
selected 20 enterprises to survey. Enterprise surveys cover profits, revenues, and a subset of
costs (including the wage bill), as well as inventories and investment.
We conducted the endline enterprise census between November 2016 and April 2017.
Enumerators sought to re-census all enterprises identified in the baseline census, as well as
any newly established enterprises. This updated census served as the endline sampling frame.
In each village we then randomly sampled to survey up to 2 enterprises operating from within
homesteads and up to 3 outside of homesteads, including those in market centers in villages
containing a market. Surveys again covered revenue, profits, employees, wages, some other
costs, and taxes paid. Our main endline sample includes 1,699 enterprises operated from
within and 1,442 from outside the homestead (both from enterprise surveys), as well as 7,899
agricultural enterprises from the household survey,
This integrated approach to household and enterprise surveying helps us match firms to
17. We calculate this as se,c
´řR
r“0
´
βˆ1r ` βˆ2r
¯
˚ `ĘAmtr|i is an untreated eligible˘¯ `
si
´řR
r“0 βˆ1r ˚
`ĘAmtr|i is ineligible˘¯, where se,c “ 1 ´ si is the population share of eligible control
village households among untreated households, and the βˆ1r and βˆ
2
r terms come from Equation (3).
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their owners; see Appendix D for more details on the enterprise matching approach. We
match all agricultural enterprises we located (as we find these via household surveys), and
56% of non-agricultural enterprises, for a total of 93% of all enterprises. Based on this match
we estimate that enterprise activity is quite localized, with 92% of total profits and 87% of
revenues accruing to owners who live within the village in which the enterprise operates.
Patterns with respect to the eligibility status of the owner are generally sensible: 28% of
non-agricultural enterprises are owned by an eligible household, slightly below their share in
the population (33%), and enterprises owned by ineligible (and thus on average somewhat
richer) households have 9% higher profits and 21% higher revenues on average than those
owned by eligibles.
2.5 Empirics: enterprises
To estimate impacts on enterprises, we combine data from agricultural enterprises (with data
from household surveys), non-farm enterprises operating within homesteads, and non-farm
enterprises operating outside of homesteads (both from enterprise surveys). We typically
pool data across all enterprise types, except when we do not observe some outcomes for
agricultural enterprises.
We estimate enterprise-level effects using versions of Equations (1) and (2), with radii
bands selected as above, interacting right hand side variables with enterprise type (Appendix
D.1 lists the full specifications). We include village-level means rather than enterprise-level
values of the lagged dependent variable given that the enterprise surveys were repeated
cross-sections. We carry out estimation using inverse probability weighting, accounting for
enterprise type, except in some cases where we also revenue-weight outcomes. As above, we
calculate and report average total effects, weighting effects for the three enterprise types.
To facilitate comparisons between the household and enterprise results, we also normalize
effects as per-household rather than per-enterprise.18 To examine extensive margin effects,
we estimate village-level analogues to this approach with the total number of enterprises
censused (per household) as the dependent variable.
2.6 Price data
We measure consumer goods prices using monthly surveys of commodity prices in local mar-
kets. These surveys were conducted over the course of 2-2.5 years in all 61 markets in the
18. Specifically, we calculate 1nhh
ř
g
x∆yge ˚ ngent, where nhh is the total number of households in the study
area (across treated and control villages), x∆yge is the estimated effect for enterprise type g, and ngent is the
number of enterprises of type g in the area.
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study area (and neighboring towns) with at least a weekly market day. These include market
centers located in towns, and so will appropriately reflect the impacts of households (poten-
tially) traveling to towns to spend their transfers. Figure 2 shows the substantial variation
in treatment intensity around markets, as well as the heterogeneity in village proximity to
markets. The average village had 0.7 markets located within 2 km and 2.3 markets within
4 km, again indicating the rather high density of residential settlement. Households report
an average commuting time to their preferred market of 33 minutes, where more than 75
percent of respondents walk to the market.
Market surveys collected prices for 72 relatively homogeneous products, including food
(grains, vegetables, fruit, meat), livestock (goats, sheep), hardware (nails, paint), “duka”
(kiosk store) products (non-food and packaged food), and others (e.g., fuel, health items,
household items, and farming implements). We collected quotes from three vendors of each
product in each market in each month, and use the median for each product-market-month.
We then calculate linear log-price indices by weighting prices by household expenditure
shares.19 We also examine effects on component subcategories of goods, which include: food
items; non-food non-durables (such as soap, cooking fat, and firewood); durables (such as
iron sheets, mosquito nets, and jerry cans used for transporting water or fuel); livestock; and
temptation goods, i.e., alcohol and tobacco.
We measure prices of the major factors of production using household survey data on
wages, land prices, and interest rates on formal and informal borrowing and lending. Because
compositional changes in these inputs may be important, we examine quantity and price
effects for them side by side.
2.7 Empirics: prices
We estimate effects on consumer goods prices using both spatial and temporal variation in
the amount of cash distributed around each market. Specifically, we estimate
pmt “
ÿ
rPR¯
Mÿ
l“0
βrl ˜Amtmpt´lqr ` αm ` λt ` εmt (4)
where pmt is a price outcome for market m in month t. ˜Amtmpt´lqr is the per-household
amount transferred within band r around market m in month t´ l, expressed as a fraction
19. We use expenditure data from the the Kenya Life Panel Survey (Baird et al. 2016) conducted in 2013-
2014 in rural areas of Siaya and neighboring Busia county. We use the KLPS data because we did not
collect a full expenditure module at baseline due to time and budget constraints, and prefer not to use
endline expenditure data which are potentially endogenous. That said, results are nearly unchanged if we
use endline consumption expenditure shares from untreated households.
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of GDP. We exploit our panel setup by conditioning on fixed effects for both markets (αm)
and months (λt). The former absorb any systematic price differences across markets (as well
as differences in the share of eligible households located around those markets), while the
latter account for seasonal differences and other time trends common to all markets. We
again account for spatial correlation in calculating standard errors (Conley 1999; 2008).
We determine both the relevant spatial distance R and the relevant temporal lag M
over which price effects persist by minimizing an information criterion, similar to above.
Specifically, and following a pre-specified approach (Haushofer et al. (2016)), we first select
the optimal number of spatial buffer rings by estimating models of the form
pmt “
18´20kmÿ
r“0´2km
βr
´
˜Amtmtr ` ˜Amtmpt´1qr ` ˜Amtmpt´2qr
¯
` αm ` λt ` εmt (5)
Note that in this specification we impose the assumption that transfers over the preceding
quarter are what determine prices in month t. We select the value R “ R¯ that minimizes
the Schwartz BIC while imposing weak monotonicity. We then select the number of monthly
lags by estimating Equation (16) with R “ R¯ and selecting the model that minimizes the
Schwartz BIC. With few exceptions, this procedure selects a single 0-2 km band around
each market and a single temporal effect, implying that we only include contemporaneous
transfers in estimating price effects.
Identification in Equation (16) comes from the roll-out of treatment across space and
time, and the project’s research design leads to substantial variation in both dimensions.
The 10-90 percentile range for total amounts in annual per capita GDP going to the 0–2
km ring around each market over the entire period is [2%, 13%]. Moreover, the multi-year
nature of the data for each market cover periods both of intensive transfer distribution as
well as times when no transfers were going out. As above, we are unable to capture price
increases that radiate throughout the entire study area (compared to neighboring counties)
over the entire period, but the highly localized nature of the price effects that we do detect
suggests that any such effects are unlikely to be large.
We use estimates of Equation (16) to calculate two price effects. The implied average
treatment effect (ATE) is the average price effect across all markets and all months in which
any transfers went out to any market in the study area, i.e., during the study period of
September 2014 to March 2017. This is simply equal to the estimated coefficients multiplied
by the mean of the corresponding regressors of interest. The average maximum transfer effect
is the average across markets of the estimated effect in the month in which the maximum
amount of cash (as a share of GDP) was distributed into the selected radii bands (in other
words, out to R¯) from the market.
16
We estimate effects on input prices using Equations (1), (2), and (3), as our input price
data come from household surveys, and report the corresponding average treatment effects.
We focus on two sources of heterogeneous price effects. First, we classify goods into trad-
ables and non-tradables, where tradables include relatively easily transported, non-perishable
items, and non-tradables include more difficult to transport or perishable items.20 Second,
we classify markets into those with better or worse market access. Standard theory in in-
ternational trade predicts that more integrated markets should be less likely to experience
meaningful price changes for commodities following a local aggregate demand shock. We
thus examine output price heterogeneity with respect to a commonly used metric of market
access (MAm):
MAm “
ÿ
d
τ´θmdNd «
10ÿ
r“0
r´θNr (6)
Geographic distance r is used to proxy for trade costs between origin market m and des-
tination d, i.e., τmd “ r. Destinations are 1 km radii bands around each market, with
total population Nr in each buffer, and we follow Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) in setting
θ “ 8. Within quantiles of this metric, we calculate average and average maximum transfer
treatment effects in the manner described above.
3 Tracing out the path of spending
We now turn to tracing out the path of spending induced by the cash transfer experimental
intervention. We start by documenting effects for recipient households, then move onto
enterprises and untreated households. Monetary units are USD PPP unless otherwise defined
(where the transfer was worth USD 1,871 PPP), flow outcomes are annualized, and monetary
outcomes are top-coded at the 99th percentile (as pre-specified), unless otherwise noted.21
3.1 Recipient household effects
We first present impacts on the spending, saving and economic activity of recipients them-
selves. The main expenditure measure is the (annualized) sum of total food consumption
in last 7 days, frequent purchases in the last month, and infrequent purchases over the last
20. For instance, tradables include building materials (e.g., timber, cement, nails, iron sheets) and some
household goods (soap, firewood, charcoal, batteries, washing powder, mattress, soap), while non-tradables
include some food items (e.g., avocado, banana, cabbage, egg, pork, fish) and livestock. These classifications
were undertaken based on feedback from local staff, but there may, of course, be some ambiguity about how
to best classify specific items. The full classification (as pre-specified) is included in Appendix E.
21. Our main measures were pre-specified, though the groupings in some cases vary from the pre-analysis
plan in order to ease exposition.
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12 months.22 Durables expenditures are measured as the sum of spending on home mainte-
nance, home improvement, and other household durables, and the remainder is classified as
non-durable spending.
As expected, recipient households report significantly higher total expenditure: USD PPP
293 more expenditure than eligible households in control villages (Table 1, column 1), an
11.5% increase over the control village in low saturation area mean of USD PPP 2,537. The
estimated total treatment effect, including spatial effects, is larger at USD PPP 343, a 13.5%
increase (column 2). This pattern between columns 1 and 2 is a first piece of evidence for
the existence of localized, positive cross-village spillovers which we will see repeated across
other outcomes.
The pattern of expenditure increases is broadly consistent with earlier work (Haushofer
and Shapiro 2016). Both non-durable and durable spending increase substantially. Food
expenditure accounts for a sizable portion of the overall increase in non-durable expenditure
in both columns (41% and 65%, respectively). We can reject meaningful increases in reported
spending on temptation goods (alcohol, tobacco and gambling), consistent with earlier work
(Evans and Popova 2017).23
Consistent with increased expenditure on durables, asset stocks also increase (Table 1,
Panel B). Anecdotally, many recipients withdrew money from M-Pesa immediately and saved
via durable assets. The main pre-specified measure of assets includes livestock; transporta-
tion (bicycles, motorcycles, and cars); electronics; farm tools; furniture; and other home
goods. We add in net household lending to, and borrowing from, both formal and informal
sources. This measure of assets increases by USD PPP 174, or 24% of the mean for eligible
households in control villages in low saturation sublocations.24 This measure excludes the
values of housing and land, which are harder to measure given thin local markets, but also
likely important given existing work shows that households often use GD transfers to in-
vest in housing (Haushofer and Shapiro 2016). We separately measure housing value as the
22. The survey was quite comprehensive. In addition to food consumption, frequent purchases include
airtime and other phone expenses; internet; transport expenses (including petrol); lottery tickets and gam-
bling; clothing and shoes; recreation and entertainment; personal toiletry and grooming; household items,
such as cleaning products and candles; firewood, charcoal and kerosene; electricity; and water. Infrequent
purchases include house rent/mortgage; home maintenance; home improvements; religious expenses; educa-
tion expenses; charitable donations; weddings and funerals; medical expenses; household durables, including
furniture, lamps, cutlery, pots and pans and other kitchen equipment; and dowry or bride price.
23. While there is surely some under-reporting of temptation goods, the fact that the control group mean
is non-trivial demonstrates that at least some households do feel comfortable report such spending. Given
that we do not generally observe expenditure immediately after transfers were distributed, we cannot fully
rule out the possibility that temptation good spending increased temporarily at that time.
24. The mean for eligible household in control villages and low saturation sublocations is USD PPP 724
(with SD 863), substantially less than the overall mean, which is not surprising since ineligible households
own more assets on average.
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respondent’s self-reported cost to build a home like theirs, and land value as landholdings
multiplied by the household’s report of the per-acre cost of land of similar quality (in their
village). Estimated housing value increases by USD PPP 391, or 65% of the control mean,
and estimated land value increases, but this effect is not statistically significant.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that increases in expenditure on non-durables,
durable assets and housing improvements a year and a half after the transfer together ac-
count for roughly sixty percent of the transfer value, assuming consumption effects on the
treated were constant over time between the first transfer and the endline household survey.
In the most basic Keynesian model, this marginal propensity to consume of 0.6 would imply
a substantial multiplier of 1
1´MPC « 2.5; we return to empirically estimating this multiplier
in more detail in section 4.
Theoretically, the effect of a wealth transfer on earnings is ambiguous: it may reduce
labor supply through an income effect, but may also enable productive investment. In the
data, recipient households’ income from all sources (excluding the GD transfers) does not
appear to have decreased: point estimates are positive (USD PPP 78 and 131 in the two
main specifications) and the reduced form effect is marginally significant.25 Examining labor
supply specifically, we do not find evidence that recipient households worked less; if anything,
total hours worked by recipient households in agriculture, self-employment and employment
increased slightly (Table 2, Panel A, columns 1 and 2). This is consistent with the studies
reviewed by Banerjee et al. (2017), which generally have found that cash transfers in low
and middle income countries do not reduce labor supply.
Interestingly, we also see little heterogeneity in estimated treatment effects on measures
of assets, expenditure, income, and hours worked for eligible households across eight pre-
specified dimensions of baseline characteristics (Figure A.2): respondent gender, an indicator
for being over age 25, marital status, primary school completion, an indicator for having a
child in the household, an indicator for being above the median on our measure of psycho-
logical well-being, and work status (in self-employment or wage employment).
The effect on net transfers received from other households is also notable: the point
estimate is negative but not statistically significant, and we can reject large changes in
either direction. This suggests that relatively little of the cash transfer was literally shared
with neighbors or social contacts.
25. As is common in many low-income settings, we find that measured values of consumption are larger
than measured household income. Total measured local income and firm revenue is lower than measured
expenditures, in part, because expenditure includes important categories like medical and schooling expenses,
utilities, rent and mortgage, religious and charitable donations, and dowry, wedding and funeral costs for
which we do not typically measure corresponding revenues in the enterprise data. Expenditure measures
may also better capture consumption of own-farm production than the agricultural revenue data.
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Overall, these results highlight that cash transfer recipients substantially increased their
expenditure on a broad range of goods. This spending was likely financed primarily by the
initial transfers themselves, with possibly some contribution from higher earnings. A large
share of this spending likely takes place locally: enterprises report that 86 percent of their
customers come from within the same village or sublocation. We therefore turn next to
examining impacts on local enterprises.
3.2 Enterprise effects
We measure (annualized) revenues and profits for non-agricultural enterprises directly by
asking respondents about these quantities (Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009). We cal-
culate costs as the sum of the employee wage bill, rent and security costs; this is not a
comprehensive measure of all costs, and hence we do not expect the revenue measure to
equal our measure of profits plus measured costs. For agricultural enterprises, total revenue
is calculated as the sum of crop output (measured at the crop level) plus the value of pastoral
and poultry output sold, and the value of the household’s own consumption of pastoral and
poultry output.26 Agricultural costs are the wage bill, all agricultural inputs (e.g., seed and
fertilizer), and land rental costs. We then calculate agricultural profits as total agricultural
revenue minus agricultural costs. Recall that we include firm sector fixed effects to absorb
any systematic differences in measurement by sector.
There are large increases in revenue for enterprises in both treatment and control villages
(Table 3, Panel A). Revenues in treated villages increased by USD PPP 348 per household, a
46% increase, while those in control villages increased by USD PPP 231 (30%). Revenue gains
are concentrated in the retail and manufacturing sectors. Both treatment and control villages
experience statistically significant increases in manufacturing revenue of similar magnitudes
– USD PPP 107 and 105, respectively – while treatment villages see larger gains in retail
revenue (USD PPP 132 versus USD PPP 54) (Appendix Table A.3).
Estimated effects on profits are positive, but moderate in magnitude and not significantly
different from zero. In fact, profit margins (measured as the ratio of profit to revenues) fell
(Panel A, Row 5). We also see no evidence of firm entry, as one might have expected if
enterprises were becoming more profitable (Panel C). Overall, the data indicate that higher
revenues were largely absorbed by increased payments to various factors of production. While
we do not directly observe all of these payments in our data, we do see significant increases in
the factors that we directly measure, and particularly in the wage bill: enterprises in treated
26. In cases when crop output was reported in non-monetary units, we convert these to monetary values
using the median crop output price measured in the market price surveys during endline data collection in
the household’s subcounty of residence.
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(control) villages increase spending on labor by USD PPP 85 (73), a sizable change relative
to the control mean.
Strikingly, we do not see strong evidence of a firm investment response. Estimated
increases in fixed capital investment are small, and we can reject large changes (Panel B,
Row 2). We do see a modest increase of USD PPP 35 in inventories for enterprises located in
treated villages, yet even this appears to be less than proportional to the increase in firm sales;
in other words, these enterprises are, if anything, operating leaner business models (Panel B,
Row 1). This pattern of results suggests that the expansion in enterprise activity is driven
more by the shock to local aggregate demand than by a relaxation of credit constraints that
had previously limited investment.
One caveat to this point is that many household assets are difficult to categorize into
“productive” assets as opposed to consumer durables. For example, bicycles may be used for
personal transportation (i.e., to visit friends), but could also be used for operating a bicycle
taxi to generate income. We therefore inclusively categorize as “potentially productive” both
livestock as well as a number of non-agricultural assets that could potentially be used for
income-generating activities (beyond simply renting out the asset).27 When we do so, overall
roughly half of the increase in household asset ownership documented above is in what we
believe to be purely non-productive assets, with small gains in productive agricultural assets
(e.g., farm tools) and a modest gain for potentially productive assets (Table A.2).28 We
also fail to detect any investment response for non-agricultural enterprises owned by treated
households: neither investment nor inventories increase relative to eligible owners in control
villages (Table A.4, Panel B). Taken together, these patterns are also consistent with the
cash transfer program generating only a limited local investment response.
3.3 Non-recipient household effects
We next examine how the spending behavior of recipient households, and its impacts on
local enterprises, affected non-recipient households. Recall that non-recipients include both
eligible households living in control villages, and ineligible households living in both control
and treatment villages.
We find positive and significant expenditure effects for untreated households, measured on
average roughly a year and half after the start of cash transfers. Column 3 of Table 1, Panel
27. Potentially productive non-agricultural assets include bicycles, motorcycles, cars, boats, kerosene stoves,
sewing machines, electric irons, computers, mobile phones, car batteries, solar panels or systems, and gen-
erators. Examples of residual non-productive assets include radio/CD players, kerosene lanterns, beds,
mattresses, bednets, tables, sofas, chairs, cupboards, clocks, televisions, and iron sheets.
28. For comparability across categories, results in this table do not include net borrowing, which is included
in Table 1.
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A presents results based on Equation (3). Notably, the magnitude of these gains (USD PPP
334, p-value ă 0.01) are quite similar to those of treated households (USD PPP 343). The
pattern of expenditure increases is also broadly similar to that for treated households, except
that spending on durables does not increase among untreated households. One possible
reason for the similarity in overall spending impacts is that the timing of effects on recipient
and non-recipient households may be different, with recipient households showing impacts
earlier than non-recipient households, but effects converging by roughly one year after the
final transfer was received.
How did non-recipients fund these consumption gains? One possibility is that they are
dis-saving, perhaps due to social pressure to “keep up with the Joneses”, their neighbors who
received the transfer. However, this does not appear to be the case: estimated treatment
estimates for total assets, housing and land values are all positive, although not significant
(Table 1, Panel B). Nor do we observe a borrowing response for untreated households from
either formal and informal sources (Table 2, Panel C, column 3). A second potential expla-
nation is that expenditure gains reflect inter-household transfers to non-recipient households,
as documented in Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) for Mexico. This also does not seem to be
the case, as we find no significant increase in net transfers received by untreated households,
and the point estimate of USD PPP 8.75 is less than 3 percent of the expenditure gain for
untreated households; this mirrors the lack of an effect on net transfers among recipient
households noted earlier.
Rather, the data suggest that consumption gains are driven by higher earned income:
total annualized income increases by USD PPP 229. It is often argued in development
economics that survey estimates of consumption are better measured and often substantially
larger than estimates of income, particularly for poor households (Deaton and Zaidi 2002;
Deaton 2018). While this is true in our case, we cannot reject that the total effect on
income is the same as the effect on consumption expenditure for untreated households (p
= 0.21). Income gains come largely from wage earnings, which increase by USD PPP 182,
with a smaller and not significant contribution from profits from owned enterprises. These
results are broadly in line with the enterprise results, in which profit increases were modest
and marginally significant while the wage bill expanded significantly, by 71 and 61% in
treatment and control villages, respectively (Table 3, row 4). Higher wage earnings appear
more likely to reflect higher wages than increased labor supply, as the point estimate for
overall household labor supply is actually somewhat negative (although there does appear to
be an increase in hours worked in wage employment for the respondent, Table A.5). Hourly
wages earned by untreated household increase meaningfully, although the estimate is only
marginally significant (Table 2, Panel A).
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To sum up the results so far, cash transfer recipient households receive and spend most
of the transfer, leading to higher local enterprise revenues. This positive aggregate demand
shock, in turn, appears to increase the income of local untreated households, leading to
higher spending on their part. This pattern provides initial evidence for a positive multiplier
effect of the cash transfer program, an issue we return to below.
3.4 Price effects
We turn next to effects on consumer goods prices – which are important for understanding
the extent to which other monetary impacts are real as opposed to nominal, among other
things – followed by the prices of major factors of production: labor, land and capital.
3.4.1 Output prices
Overall, we find small, positive and precisely estimated effects on consumer goods prices.
As described above, the main measure is an expenditure-weighed log-index of market prices,
constructed at the market level from data on a list of 72 products, with sub-indices for
tradable and non-tradable goods. Both the ATE and average maximum transfer effect are
small and precisely estimated near zero across all product categories (Table 4). The tight
standard errors allow us to rule out even relatively small price effects: with 95 percent
confidence, the ATE across the study period is below 0.0025 log points, or 0.25 percent.
For the average maximum transfer effect across markets, the upper bound of the 95 percent
confidence interval is 0.011 log points, or 1.1 percent. In addition to these overall price
effects, price effects are small across almost all product categories. In particular, food prices
are in line with the overall price index, and durables do not increase meaningfully in price.
To help mitigate concerns that results may be sensitive to the price index weights or product
classification, we find that average price inflation is below 1% for every product in the data.
Observed variation in price responses is generally in line with theoretical predictions.
We find a significant (but economically small) price increase for non-tradable goods, while
the effect for tradable goods is smaller and not statistically significant. We also observe
somewhat larger increases in markets less integrated into the local economy, as defined by
our measure of market access (Section 2.7). Columns 3 and 4 split markets into those above
and below median market access, with estimated effects frequently more positive in more
remote markets. Figure A.3 further breaks this pattern down by quartile of market access,
with lower values reflecting more isolated markets. Panels A-C show a small amount of
inflation for non-tradables in the most isolated markets, and no detectable price changes
elsewhere or for other goods. Inflation for non-tradables in isolated markets nonetheless
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remains limited, at 0.2-0.3% on average. We also carried out enterprise phone surveys of a
subset of enterprise types during the period in which transfers were going out, which collected
price data on a limited number of products; price effects on these local manufacturing and
services prices are also limited (see Appendix E.2).
These patterns are qualitatively similar to findings from Cunha, De Giorgi, and Jay-
achandran (2018), who study the price effects of an in-kind food and cash transfer program
in Mexico: in-kind transfers there lead to price decreases, while cash transfers lead to price
increases, but their estimated effects are small except in remote villages. In contrast, these
price effects are far smaller than those Filmer et al. (2018) estimate in the Philippines,
which are 5 to 7% for protein-rich foods, although lower for other product categories. Burke,
Bergquist, and Miguel (2019) show that a credit intervention impacting the supply of sta-
ples also affects local grain market prices in a different region of Kenya. Reconciling these
divergent results with ours is a task for future research.
3.4.2 Input prices
Table 2 presents estimated effects on input prices measured in the household survey data
(some of which we have previously mentioned). We find some evidence of higher wages. In
row 1 of Table 2, we examine wages for employees using household survey data. We include
each household member that reports working for wages as an observation, and calculate their
hourly wage based on hours worked in the last 7 days and their monthly salary (adjusted to
weekly scale). In the reduced form specification, eligible households in treatment villages earn
USD PPP 0.11 more per hour, on a base of USD PPP 0.70. This effect is no longer significant,
however, when we also estimate across-village spillovers. For untreated households, the
increase is even more marked at 0.19 USD PPP per hour, and this effect is significant at
the 10% level. These potentially large wage effects do not seem to be driven by large labor
supply responses. In row 2, we calculate the total hours worked by adult household members
in agriculture, self-employment and employment, and estimate effects at the household level.
Effects are relatively small and not significant. Together with the fact that enterprise wage
bills increased significantly, these patterns are strongly suggestive of positive local wage
effects (Table 3).
Effects on estimated land prices are positive and economically meaningful (at 9-14%),
but not statistically significant (Table 2, Panel B). Our measure of land prices is a noisy one;
as noted above, land prices are difficult to measure as formal sales are rare, and so we use
respondents’ self-reports of the amount per acre land like theirs in the same village would
sell for. We also examine land rental prices as a robustness check, which yield data on actual
land transactions for a subset of respondents; we do not find significant effects on land rental
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prices (Table A.6). Unsurprisingly (given land should be in relatively fixed supply), we find
little change in total landholdings among treated households or those in more heavily treated
areas. We also find no effects on total land rentals, nor on the total amount of land used for
agriculture (Table A.6).
Finally, we observe fairly precisely estimated null effects on interest rates and total bor-
rowing (Table 2, Panel C). We measure household borrowing from both formal (e.g., commer-
cial banks, mobile credit services) and informal (family and friends, moneylenders) sources.
The total loan amount reports total borrowing across sources in the last 12 months, setting
those that did not borrow equal to zero. Note that the loan-weighted interest rate is the
monthly interest rate on the most recent loan by source, weighted by the total amount of
borrowing by source; we include informal loans without interest, which brings down the
average rate.
4 The fiscal multiplier
We next examine what the household and enterprise responses imply for the aggregate level of
economic activity, and specifically for the value of the local fiscal multiplier of cash transfers,
where ‘local’ refers to the entire study area. As is standard in the literature, we define this
multiplier M as the cumulative effect of transfers on local GDP relative to the total amount
T transferred:
M “ 1
T
ˆż 8
t“0
∆GDPt
˙
(7)
The size of the fiscal multiplier is generally thought to depend in part on the policy
context in which outlays are made, and in particular on the extent to which (i) monetary
policy reacts, and/or (ii) households and firms expect levels of future taxation to change
(e.g., whether Ricardian equivalence holds). Our setting is unusual in a useful way: because
we observe a large one-time fiscal outlay that was made philanthropically and funded from
outside of the economy we study, we can reasonably expect to measure a “pure” fiscal
multiplier that should be independent of such effects. This feature generates estimates that
can be thought of as a model primitive, and with which estimates from other financing
scenarios can be contrasted.29
An initial back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the multiplier may be substan-
tial: static estimates of annualized consumption, income, and revenue measured 18 months
29. Chodorow-Reich (2019) shows that external financing and local debt-financing generate quantitatively
similar multipliers in practice. Our estimate, therefore, may be closely related to what he calls the no-
monetary-policy-response deficit-financed national multiplier. Ramey (2011) reviews the literature and con-
cludes the multiplier for temporary, debt-financed government spending is between 0.8 and 1.5, and Ramey
and Zubiary (2018) find smaller estimates of the fiscal multiplier using different methods and data.
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after a mean cash injection of 8.5% of GDP all increased by around 14-18%, suggesting a
multiplier of roughly 2. In this section, we refine this estimate by both accounting as fully
as possible for effects on all components of GDP, including spillover effects, and properly
accounting for treatment effect dynamics. Given the precisely estimated and economically
small price effects estimated above, we focus on impacts on nominal GDP.
Following national accounts definitions, the expenditure-based measure of local GDP is
GDPt “ Ct ` It ` Gt ` NXt, where Ct is consumption expenditure on non-durables and
durables, measured as quarterly consumption plus accumulated assets at endline.30 To avoid
potential double-counting, we exclude home durables from the consumption measure as part
of this expenditure may be reflected in an accumulation of assets. In addition, we exclude
net lending as well as home and land values from the asset measure because changes in home
and land values may not be driven purely by investment, and because we think of land supply
as being essentially fixed. These exclusions may lead us to err on the side of understating
the multiplier, for instance, dropping home durables lowers the expenditure multiplier by
0.2, and home and land values have an even bigger impact. It is enterprise investment plus
accumulated inventories at endline. We exclude local government expenditure, Gt, as Walker
(2018) shows that the intervention had a precisely estimated null effect on it.
Since we also measure household and enterprise income, we can construct a dual income-
based measure of local GDP as the sum of factor payments and profits: GDPt “ Wt `Rt `
Πt`Taxt´NFIt, where Wt is the total household wage bill, Rt are rental expenses of local
enterprises, Πt are enterprise profits, and Taxt is total enterprise taxes.
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The expenditure- and income-based measures of GDP we generate are based on unusually
rich underlying data, but each has potential limitations. In particular, each may misattribute
transactions between agents located in the study area and counterparties located outside.
In the expenditure case, the main concern is that we do not directly observe net exports
(NXt). Imports show up as expenditure but are not local GDP, while exports do not show up
in expenditure but are part of local GDP. To the extent that cash transfers decrease (increase)
net exports from the study area, our expenditure multiplier would overstate (understate) the
multiplier. Intuitively, we might expect net exports to fall following a large external income
transfer: since many local firms are retail establishments, imports of intermediate goods
30. Note that by measuring impacts on asset stocks we (correctly) do not count transfers of existing assets
between local agents as GDP, since these increase one agent’s balance sheet while decreasing another’s. Such
transactions only potentially introduce bias if they involve a non-local counterparty, as discussed below.
31. We employ the household rather than enterprise wage bill, as the household survey sample is larger
and includes individual-level wage earnings data. We omit land rental income because we do not see any
significant evidence of effects on this above; this may lead us to understate the multiplier. In principle, a third
approach to estimating GDP would be to aggregate value added from local enterprises; we do not implement
this as we did not collect sufficiently comprehensive data on enterprise expenditures on intermediate inputs.
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(including packaged consumer goods ready for sale) would likely increase. This suggests
that the expenditure-based approach might be upwardly biased away from zero.32 Note that
transactions between agents within our study area are correctly accounted for: for example,
if study village A imports goods from study village B then the value of these goods should be
included in local GDP as they are produced within our study area. We present an extension
below assessing how sensitive our multiplier estimate is to different assumptions about net
exports. Of course, increases in net imports could in part reflect increases in economic
activity outside of the study area due to the GD transfers, which our concept of the local
multiplier does not capture but which are a part of the broader impact of the intervention.
In the income case, potential bias could arise if there are changes in net wage income
(NFIt) earned outside the study area, since this is not considered part of local GDP. This
bias seems unlikely to be quantitatively important in our setting: 86% of all employees of
study-area enterprises are family labor (and therefore presumably overwhelmingly local),
and among individuals employed for a wage, only 6% report an employment contact address
outside the study area. To the extent some bias remains, we would expect it to be negative
(towards zero), if net labor income earned outside the study area decreases in response to
higher local business revenue, employment and wages. This suggests that the income-based
approach may yield a lower bound on the multiplier.
Overall, we view the expenditure- and income-based multipliers as two distinct measures
of the same underlying concept, each with its own limitations. Reflecting this, below we
estimate them jointly and test individual as well as joint hypotheses across the two measures.
4.1 Empirical strategy
To capture the full dynamic response of GDP, we estimate and then integrate effects on
each component discussed above over time.33 For each flow variable x (e.g., consumption,
investment, wage income, etc.), we first estimate the following specification, which is a
dynamic extension of previous estimating equations:
xit,v “ αt `
10ÿ
s“0
βs ˜Amtv,t´s `
10ÿ
s“0
γs ˜Amt
0-2km
 v,t´s ` εit,v
32. Note that direct imports by households themselves are unlikely to increase because on average only
10% of households report shopping at a market outside our study area, and overall the impacts we see on
household spending and local enterprise revenue are fairly similar, suggesting that consumer spending was
quite localized. Similarly, non-farm businesses report only 5% of customers coming from outside the study
area, and that share does not change significantly in response to treatment.
33. We stated our intention to estimate a multiplier in our pre-analysis plans, but did not fully specify the
approach for doing so.
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The coefficients in this model are well-identified: both treatment status and survey times
were randomized across villages, and also rolled out to different villages in a randomized
order. The main challenge is that the first household surveys started around 12 months after
the experimental start date in each village, while enterprise surveys began after about 18
months (see Figure 1). With a few exceptions, recall periods are less than or equal to one
month, so we often do not directly observe the initial response in flow variables in the months
immediately after the first transfers went to a village, which is when we might expect to see
some of the largest impacts on expenditure. However, given that our specification treats
each dollar transferred symmetrically, we can still estimate the local response during these
early quarters because transfers to recipients rolled out over 8 months.34 Similarly, we
can estimate neighborhood effects using the substantial variation in the timing with which
nearby villages were treated. We tend to obtain less precise estimates of responses in early
quarters immediately following transfers, however, as they are estimated using less variation
in treatment intensity compared to later quarters. Given this, we also examine, and present
in the appendix, estimates of the multiplier that assume no impacts occurred during the first
three quarters following a transfer; these estimates are almost surely biased downwards, as
they miss all economic activity in the initial period following transfers, but are considerably
more precisely estimated and thus may be attractive to consider, for instance, if a goal is to
minimize mean squared error.
We then integrate dynamic effects on flow variables over time up to 29 months (10
quarters) after treatment. We compute the dynamic profile of treatment effects (or the
impulse response function, IRF) using the coefficients estimated above and assuming that
the treatment rolled out to treated households as planned: the timing is a token transfer
at time 0, a first lump-sum 2 months later, and a second after 8 months. We compute this
IRF separately for treated and untreated households, and separately for three categories of
enterprise in both treatment and control villages: own-farm, non-farm enterprises operating
within households, and those operating from outside the homestead. We then aggregate the
quarterly estimates across all villages using inverse population weights from our household
and enterprise census to compute the study area-wide IRF for each flow component.
For two components of GDP, we are instead able to measure impacts on the integral
of flows over time by simply measuring impacts on accumulated stocks, simplifying the
problem. Specifically, we measure effects on durable consumption expenditure using effects
on the stock of endline household durable goods, and effects on inventory investment using
34. While the first transfer is largely unanticipated, the second and third are not and responses may differ.
However, we do not know of any borrowing against future GD payments, and credit markets are imperfect in
our context. We therefore pool all transfers in our dynamic regressions, and leave the analysis of potentially
differing effects of anticipated transfers for future research.
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effects on current inventory stocks at endline. One drawback is that these figures are likely
to under-estimate cumulative spending to the extent that some assets depreciated (or were
resold) between the time of purchase and measurement, although over the limited timeframe
considered this may be a second-order concern; any such bias would tend to reduce the
estimated multiplier. In the graphical presentation, we assume that any effects on these
stocks occurred equally across all post-treatment quarters.
Inference is conducted using the wild bootstrap clustered by sublocation, the highest unit
of randomization (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008). We test two one-sided hypotheses,
namely, that (i) each multiplier is less than zero, and (ii) each is less than one, as well as
the joint hypothesis that both multiplier estimates satisfy these conditions. There has been
extensive debate in macroeconomics about whether or not the fiscal multiplier is greater
than one (Chodorow-Reich 2019), making the second hypothesis of particular interest.
4.2 Multiplier estimates
Table 5 presents the two main multiplier estimates. We estimate a sizeable multiplier using
both approaches, in line with the back-of-envelope figure derived above.
The estimated expenditure multiplier is 2.53 (Panel A). 61% of this effect is driven by
consumption expenditures. Household asset purchases and enterprise investment make up
another 17% and 19% respectively, and enterprise inventories are not quantitatively impor-
tant. While part of the asset response could potentially reflect productive investments by
household-operated enterprises, at least 42% of the asset response comes from non-productive
assets, across both treated and untreated households (see Table A.2). Taking this into ac-
count, consumption alone leads to an estimated multiplier of 1.7, underscoring the overall
point that cash transfers appear to have led to a predominantly demand-side driven increase
in local economic activity.
As argued in section 4, the expenditure-based measure may partly reflect imports of
intermediate inputs from outside our study area, which do not constitute local GDP. As a
robustness check to gauge the magnitude of this potential bias, we first assign each component
in the consumption and asset measures to enterprise types at which the good is most likely to
be purchased (using revenue-shares of different enterprise types, where appropriate). Because
of the incomplete nature of our firm cost measure, we can determine that at most a fraction
1 ´ costi`profiti
revenuei
of the revenue of firm i is spent on intermediate goods. For each firm type,
we then get a revenue-weighted average upper bound for the share of intermediates in its
production function. Next, we make assumptions about what share of intermediate goods is
likely imported from outside the study area, conservatively erring on the side of assuming a
high share. We assume inventories are proportional to consumption expenditure and come
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entirely in terms of intermediate goods; for enterprise investment, we assume its import
share is equivalent to that of household assets, since enterprise and household assets are
fairly similar in this context. This conservative methodology yields an upper bound of 21%
for the expenditure-weighted share of local consumption that may reflect expenditure on
imported intermediate goods. If imports scale linearly with expenditure, this suggests a
multiplier of at least 2.0 on local expenditure alone (see Appendix F).
The estimated income-based multiplier is quite similar in magnitude to the expenditure-
based multiplier, at 2.81 (Panel B), and we cannot reject that they are the same (p “ 0.86).
This is notable since it is calculated using a completely distinct set of component measures.
Of this total effect, we find that 60% reflects increased enterprise profits, 36% increased
wages, and a much smaller contribution (5%) comes from from capital income and taxes
taken together. The increase in consumption, and the smaller increase in investment, we
noted above is therefore primarily accounted for by higher profits and wages. Of course, in
our context of predominantly single-person firms, “profits” likely reflect some mix of true
economic profit along with returns to the owner’s capital and labor inputs. Regardless of the
exact mix, however, this sum should be appropriate for our goal of calculating the aggregate
income-based multiplier.
We can also look at the relative contribution of treated and untreated households to
both multipliers, as a share of the total household contribution to the multiplier. Untreated
households account for 80% of the household contribution to the expenditure multiplier, and
85% of the contribution to the income multiplier, both of which are roughly their share in
the local population. This suggests that studies focusing only on recipient households may
be missing sizable shares of program benefits.
An advantage of this “macro-experimental” approach to estimating the multiplier is the
ability to conduct statistical inference. To start, we reject the null of a negative multiplier
(with a value less than zero) at the 10% level using either approach (Table 5), and reject the
null at p “ 0.02 when testing the joint restriction, and at p “ 0.04 when testing the average
of both multipliers. Since the two measures exploit distinct data, we gain statistical power
by examining both measures together. Testing the null hypothesis of a multiplier less than
one speaks more directly to recent debates. Using either the expenditure or income-based
approach alone, the p-value on this test is 0.17 and 0.18. The average of the two multipliers
is 2.67 (SE “ 1.52, p “ 0.14), and the hypothesis that the multipliers are jointly less than
one is rejected at the marginally significant p “ 0.07 level.
As noted above, the alternative approach of excluding effects on GDP during the first
three quarters after transfers arrive (and thus assuming they are zero) may be statistically
attractive in a mean squared error sense since it yields more precise, if surely somewhat
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downward biased, estimates. Under this assumption, the estimates range from 1.8 to 2.0
(smaller than the preferred estimates in Table 5, as expected), and the null hypothesis that
both multipliers estimates are jointly less than one is rejected at p “ 0.04 (Table F.2).
Figure 3 presents these results graphically, breaking up the aggregate multipliers into
quarters after transfers went out. Panel A presents the expenditure-based multiplier. The
increase in GDP is fairly stable over time; in fact, we cannot reject that the expenditure
response is constant across all quarters (p-value of 0.85). It increases slightly up to a peak
after 9 months (when the second lump-sum transfer has been received), and then slowly
decreases. Interestingly, we reject a null effect as late as two years after the transfer. The less
precisely estimated effects, with larger confidence intervals, during the first three quarters
afters transfers go out are visually apparent. The income multiplier, on the other hand,
visually appears to fluctuate more over time (Panel B): it is marked by a strong early
response in profits, while wages appear to take longer to rise. Yet as with the expenditure
measure, we cannot reject equality of all quarterly coefficients (p-value of 0.88). Future
research could investigate the dynamics following a cash infusion in further detail.
Overall, we estimate large multipliers in the range of 2.5 to 2.8, using two distinct sets
of measures, in terms of both expenditures and income. We reject the null hypothesis that
the multiplier estimates are jointly less than one at over 90% confidence, and the results
are robust across several alternative approaches. These estimates are somewhat larger than
the higher end of recent multiplier estimates in the context of public spending in the United
States (Chodorow-Reich 2019; Nakamura and Steinsson 2014), where they tend to range from
1.5 to 2.0. The finding from that literature that multiplier estimates tend to be largest in the
poorest US regions seems broadly consistent with our even larger estimates in rural Kenya,
which is poorer still. Beyond effects driven by the relative level of economic development, the
differences between our results and existing estimates may reflect other structural differences
between the Kenyan and US economies, differences in the data used, as well as any effects
on (or expectations of effects on) either monetary policy or future taxes in the US, response
effects that this study’s experimental design usefully allows us to avoid.
5 Non-market outcomes and inequality
We next examine other variables that arguably directly influence (or proxy for) well-being,
and may thus capture externalities (either between or within households). We focus on six
indices, constructed following Anderson (2008) and with components signed so that positive
values indicate better outcomes. The psychological well-being index is calculated from de-
pression, happiness, life satisfaction, and stress scales for the respondent. We interpret this
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as an overall measure of subjective well-being, possibly capturing both monetary impacts
and externalities. The health status index is made up of self-reported health, an index of
common symptoms, and an indicator for whether the respondent has experienced a major
health problem since the time of the baseline survey. The food security index is composed
of measures for the number of times a) adults and b) children skipped meals, going entire
days without food, and going to bed hungry in the last week, as well as the number of meals
with protein yesterday. We also utilize the survey questions about children to construct a
sub-index of child food security; this may capture intra-household externalities to the extent
children do not have meaningful say in the household’s allocation of resources. The educa-
tion index is composed of total education expenditure by the household, and the proportion
of school-aged children currently in school, and may similarly capture intra-household ex-
ternalities. The female empowerment index is calculated by combining a gender violence
index and a gender attitudes index. Due to the culturally sensitive nature of some of these
questions, information on gender-based violence was only collected from female respondents
being surveyed by female enumerators, resulting in a somewhat smaller sample size. Finally,
the security index captures measured levels of crime (and positive values denote less crime).35
For treated households, we find positive and significant effects for four of the six indices:
psychological well-being, food security, education and security. Estimated effects are close
to zero and not significant for the health index and female empowerment index. When
looking at total effects including spillovers for the treated, we find a similar pattern for all
but the security index.36 For untreated households, we find no significant effects of local cash
transfers except for the education index, which is higher by 0.1 SD (p ă 0.10). Importantly,
we do not find evidence of adverse spillover effects for untreated households on any of the
indices, with point estimates positive for all but the security index, which is indistinguishable
from zero (-0.02 SD, SE 0.07).
5.1 Inequality
One potential form of “psychic externality” has to do with the distribution of economic status
within communities. If households care not just about their absolute levels of consumption
or wealth, but also about comparisons with their neighbors, then these distributions may
enter directly into utility functions. From the results above, it is not immediately clear how
35. The first five of these were pre-specified as primary outcomes in our plan (Haushofer et al. (2017a));
for the sixth, the security index, all components were pre-specified as part of a family of outcomes, though
combining them into a single summary index was not. Results for all index components are in Appendix A.
36. It is notable that we do not find that treatment increases female empowerment in treated households.
The point estimates on both the reduced form and total effect are negative but not statistically significant
(-0.01 and -0.13, respectively). This contrasts with Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) who found increases in
female empowerment and reductions in domestic violence among households receiving a similar transfer.
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consumption and wealth distributions changed; transfers were targeted to relatively poor
households within each community, but we find large spillovers onto their neighbors, who
are generally somewhat better off.
To assess this, we first calculate Gini coefficients for consumption expenditure and wealth
by village and estimate village-level treatment effects. We find no significant reductions
in either measure; in fact, we estimate a small positive and marginally significant effect
of transfers on the wealth Gini in control villages (p ă 0.1, Table A.7). This is driven
by a) ineligibles (who were richer at baseline) experiencing larger spillovers than control
eligibles (Table A.8), and b) within each group, effects on initially wealthier households being
slightly larger. As a benchmark, we also calculate the effects on inequality we might have
expected to observe had there been no spillovers. Specifically, we generate counterfactual
expenditure and asset outcomes for recipient households assuming they spend 66% of their
transfer on consumption, and 34% on durable assets (this equals the ratio of effects we
find in our data, Table 1), while setting untreated households to their baseline values.37
In these counterfactual simulations, treatment reduces the Gini coefficients for assets and
consumption, but less for the latter as eligible and ineligible households differ more strongly
in terms of assets at baseline than consumption. We can reject the hypothesis that the
observed and counterfactual treatment effects on consumption inequality are the same in
treatment villages; for assets, we reject equality for both treatment and control villages.
These patterns again highlight the large spillover gains for non-recipient households: these
mean that wealthier non-recipients benefit along with recipients, and on some dimensions
(e.g., assets) they benefit so much that inequality may even slightly increase. Other programs
(e.g. Banerjee et al. (2015)) have found larger direct effects for less-poor households; here
we show that the same pattern can hold for spillover effects.
6 Conceptual framework for household welfare
To help interpret the welfare implications of the effects documented above, we next examine
a simple theoretical framework. While fairly generic, the framework categorizes the ways in
which these effects translate into changes in household welfare, including both households
that did and did not receive transfers. We also use this framework to examine the rela-
tionship between (i) the classic “equivalent variation” concept of welfare and (ii) household
expenditure, a widely used proxy measure in development economics.
Consider an indirect utility function vipTi, T q which defines the utility level achieved by
37. Since we did not collect consumption expenditure at baseline, we use random draws of low-saturation
control villages for the consumption counterfactuals. We also construct counterfactuals based on the total
effects in Table 1 (not scaled to sum up to the full transfer); our conclusions do not change fundamentally.
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household i when it receives a (possibly zero) transfer Ti while other eligible households in
the area receive transfers of T each. Define by Ti˚ the transfer that would make household
i indifferent between receiving Ti˚ on the one hand, and receiving the full intervention we
study on the other:
vipT ˚i , 0q “ vipTi, T q (8)
We aim to characterize the ways in which T affects Ti˚ . Notice that if there were no general
equilibrium effects, in the sense that vi did not depend on T , then we would simply have
Ti˚ “ Ti, i.e., the tautology that the value of receiving a dollar is simply a dollar.
Write vi as the value of some generic underlying optimization problem
vipTi, T q “ max
xi
uipxi, x´ipT qq s.t. xi P XpTi, T q (9)
Here ui captures the household’s preferences over variables xi, which it chooses, as well
as variables x´i, that others choose and that directly affect i (e.g., through externalities,
public goods provision, preferences over inequality, etc.). X is household i’s constraint set.
Preferences here are over a sequence of x’s; these need not be time separable, which allows
for non-standard time discounting, the existence of durable goods that generate a flow of
benefits, etc. This formulation highlights the fact that a change in T can alter the utility of
household i (and hence its indifference point Ti˚ ) in two broad ways. First, it may change
the constraint set X – for example, by changing the prices facing i – or its income from
various sources. Second, it may change behaviors of other households that directly affect i’s
well-being independent of its constraint set. If we interpret i as an individual rather than
a household, then the same point applies to intra-household externalities such as parental
investment in children’s education.
In the data, we observe impacts on prices and income from various sources that together
determine the household’s money budget constraint. To model this, let
vipTi, T q “ maxtxitu uiptxitu, tx´ituq ` λi
˜
Ti `
8ÿ
t“0
pδiqtpyit ´ pt ¨ fpxitqq
¸
(10)
Here the budget constraint depends on the transfer Ti the household receives at time t “ 0;
the idiosyncratic discount rate δi it faces; any transfer income yit it receives from other
households, government, or claims on the profits of local enterprises; the prices pt it faces,
and the (net) quantities fpxitq of each good or service it purchases (i.e., the sale of goods
or services is captured by negative components of fpxitq). In the simplest case, fpxq “ x
and the household simply buys or sells all commodities in the market, but the more general
structure here allows for non-separable household production using non-marketed inputs such
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as family labor (LaFave and Thomas 2016).38 Overall, this specification implies that we need
to understand effects on the exogenous (from the household’s point of view) variables prices
(pt and δi) and transfer income yit to assess welfare impacts.
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6.1 A dual approach using expenditure
Household consumption expenditure is often used as a proxy for well-being. To see how
consumption relates to well-being in the equivalent variation sense defined above, it will
be helpful to assume that the solution to the household’s problem is well-approximated
by first-order conditions (i.e., Bui{Bxit “ λiδtipt ¨ Bf{Bxit). This allows us to apply the
envelope theorem to calculate the marginal effects of Ti and T on realized welfare; doing so
and taking their ratio yields the marginal equivalent variation of an increase in transfers T
(where derivations are in Appendix H):
dEVi
dT
“ 1
λi
Bui
Bx´it ¨
Bx´it
BT `
8ÿ
t“0
pδiqt
ˆByit
BT `
t
δi
Bδi
BT sit ´
Bpt
BT ¨ fpxitq
˙
(11)
The first term here captures welfare effects through externalities and public goods, which are
of course not captured by household expenditure. The second term captures effects on the
net present value of the household’s budget constraint.40 To see how this quantity is related
to (the net present value of) expenditure, consider the simple case where households buy and
sell goods and services fpxitq “ xit “ cit ` lit, where we have decomposed xit into the goods
and services cit “ maxt0, xitu the household buys (e.g., clothes) and those lit “ mint0, xitu
that it sells (e.g., labor services). The NPV of expenditure is ei “ řpδiqtpt ¨ cit. Then
dEVi
dT
“ dei
dT
´
ÿ
pδiqt
ˆBpt
BT ¨ cit `
t
δi
Bδi
BT pt ¨ cit ´ pt ¨
Blit
BT
˙
(12)
38. For simplicity, we consider the case where the future is certain; the analysis that follows would be
effectively the same if we introduced uncertainty and took expectations.
39. Equation (10) allows for some but not all forms of credit constraint. There may be arbitrary credit
constraints within the firms that produce profits which enter into yit, and there may also be credit market
imperfections such that different households face different saving or borrowing rates δi. If we further modeled
hard constraints on household borrowing (e.g., a non-negative assets constraint), then the shadow value of
money could vary from period to period for some households; this would not change the qualitative result
that welfare effects are a function of price and income changes, but would alter the relative quantitative
value of price and income changes at different points in time.
40. While we do not pursue it here, one could in principle use Equation (11) to calculate numeric estimates
of the equivalent variation for each household i. The exercise would be quite demanding of the data, as it
requires observation or interpolation of the full time path of all outcomes and for all counterfactual transfer
amounts T P r0, T s, and would require imposing some structure (e.g., homotheticity) on preferences.
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This expression shows that changes in expenditure are closely related to changes in equivalent
variation, but with several intuitive (and correctable) sources of bias. First, expenditure
incorrectly counts appreciation of the price of consumption goods pBpt
dT
¨ citq or the time path
of consumption pBδiBT pt ¨ citq as a welfare gain. Second, it incorrectly counts income gains due
to behavioral responses such as increased labor supply ppt ¨ BlitBT q as a welfare gain. Finally, if
(more realistically) we were to examine expenditure over any finite period of time this would
introduce a third bias, as this metric would count as a welfare gain any increases in current
expenditure that were driven by decreases in future expenditure (i.e., by dis-saving).
6.2 Implications & interpretation
The empirical results can be interpreted through the lens of this framework. First, all evi-
dence points to a welfare-improving expansion in the budget sets of non-recipient households.
Changes in consumer prices were small while earnings increased substantially, driven primar-
ily by an increase in labor earnings with a smaller and not significant increase in enterprise
profits. While the data are not dispositive, the increase in labor earnings seems likely to re-
flect at least in part an increase in wages, rather than being driven by increased labor supply.
Working from the expenditure side yields a similar conclusion: both real flow expenditure
and stocks of consumer durables (which reflect past expenditures) increase, results which are
not accounted for purely by changes in consumer prices or labor supply.
Second, what data we have on welfare changes via externalities suggests that these were
generally zero or in some cases slightly positive. Public goods provision at the village level
was unchanged (Walker 2018) as were levels of crime (Table 6, row 7). Non-market outcomes
also improved: non-recipient households scored (not significantly) higher on an index of
psychological well-being. Within households, children – who have less say in decision-making
than adults – appeared better off, with significantly higher food security and education
scores (Table 6, rows 4 and 5). An index of female empowerment, on the other hand, did
not change significantly among either recipient or non-recipient households (Table 6, row
7). One potential exception concerns inequality (Table A.7); if households have preferences
over their relative socioeconomic standing within the community, then the fact that positive
spillovers were so large as to generate a small net increase in asset inequality (despite the
means-testing of the initial transfers) may have been a source of disutility.
7 Discussion: productive responses
The results above, and in particular the modest price responses and large multiplier es-
timates, raise the question what features of the local economy enabled it to respond as
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elastically as it did to a large shock to aggregate demand. While fully addressing this ques-
tion is beyond the scope of the present project, we outline here what we can say given the
available data.
We note first that any explanation of these patterns must apply to the retail and man-
ufacturing sectors specifically, as this is where output gains are concentrated. Table A.3
reports this decomposition. Estimated increases in services and agriculture are more modest
and not significantly different from zero.
Next, we find limited evidence of increased employment of the main factors of production:
land, labor, or capital. Land is of course in relatively fixed supply; agricultural households
do not report owning or renting more of it (Table A.6) and we would not expect it to be a
limiting factor in retail or manufacturing production. We find no significant change in total
household labor supply (Table 2), though we do see a net shift out of self-employment and into
wage employment (Table A.5, Panel A), with the latter increasing by 1.7 hours per person
per week on average. These estimates are not statistically different from zero, however, and
even under generous assumptions can explain only around a 5% increase in real output,
well below the total response we observe.41 Finally, for the non-agricultural enterprises that
increased their output, we observe no significant changes in investment in fixed capital (Table
3, row 7), and while inventories increased somewhat they actually decrease in proportion to
sales (from 26% to 21%, Table 3, row 6). Moreover, if output increased due to investment
activity, then we would expect to see these increases concentrated in enterprises owned by
transfer recipients (who gained access to a new source of capital), but if anything we find
the opposite (Table A.4).
In a purely accounting sense, this means that a large share of the increase in output must
be due to an increase in the throughput of intermediate goods and in the utilization of factors
of production used to process them. This is consistent with observation of the retail and
manufacturing enterprises in the area, which typically involve some degree of “on-demand”
production. A retail establishment, for example, requires premises and an employee to “mind
the shop,” but once these are in place the volume of goods it retails depends largely on
consumer demand. Similarly, many small-scale manufacturing enterprises require equipment
and staff to be in place but then produce only when customers arrive. In fact, about 60% of
manufacturing revenue accrues to just two enterprise types, grain (posho) mills and welding
establishments, both of which often operate “on-demand.”
These examples suggest retail and manufacturing sectors in which there are meaningful
41. Specifically, an increase of 1.7 hours per person is a 7.4% increase in wage labor hours. Assuming a
Cobb-Douglas production function with a labor share of 2{3, and no productive value of time given up from
self-employment, this implies a 4.9% increase in real output.
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costs that are fixed over the relevant ranges – e.g. the costs of a building, of a mill, or of hiring
a single employee – and as a result meaningful slack capacity that can be better utilized as
demand increases. While we did not collect direct measures of capacity utilization, some
indirect evidence suggests the existence of meaningful slack. The average non-agricultural
enterprise saw just 1.7 customers per hour, in between which all other inputs (i.e. employee
time, fixed capital, inventories, etc.) may sit idle. For labor inputs in particular, 72% of
non-agricultural enterprises have just a single employee, which suggests that (due to integer
constraints) the labor input into these business is essentially fixed over the relevant range.
Given this structure of production, we would expect the revenue from additional sales to
be paid out to (i) the suppliers of intermediate goods, (ii) the suppliers of elastic factors of
production, whose marginal product increased as they became better utilized, and finally to
(iii) enterprise owners to the extent they are able to extract economic profits. We do not
directly measure purchases of intermediates, but upper bounds for the expenditure-weighted
share of intermediate inputs in total sales are sizeable, at 55% in the retail and 24% in the
manufacturing sector (see Appendix F). Consistent with (ii), we do see an increase in wage
bills which accounts for 27% of increased revenue (Table 3). Estimated effects on profits,
meanwhile, are modest and not statistically significant (and may in any case be better
interpreted as returns to the owners’ capital which, as usual, are difficult to distinguish from
true economic profits).
While only suggestive, this interpretation of the supply side response to a demand shock
is consistent with other recent findings in East African settings. In ongoing work in Uganda,
for example, Bassi et al. (2019) find that employees in on-demand manufacturing (welding,
furniture-making) spend about 25% of time “waiting for customers” or “eating and resting.”
More broadly, it harkens back to an old idea in development economics that it might be
possible to expand production without notable price inflation due to the availability of slack
capacity. Classic arguments focused on “surplus labor” (Lewis 1954), while here it was
apparently possible to increase the utilization of both labor and capital. The issue here may
have been not that wages are kept artificially high as in Lewis (1954), but rather that there
are real constraints that limit the ability to flexibly scale the employment of capital and
labor to match demand. Mechanisms to address this through better coordination, such as
periodic markets, do so imperfectly, leaving some degree of residual excess capacity.42
42. A growing literature has also found evidence of excess capacity in rich countries, especially in periods
of recession (e.g., Murphy (2017), Michaillat and Saez (2015), and Chodorow-Reich (2019)).
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8 Conclusion
A large-scale cash transfer program in rural Kenya led to sharp increases in the consumption
expenditures of treated households, and extensive broader effects on the local economy,
including large revenue gains for local firms (that line up in magnitude with household
consumption gains), as well as similar increases in consumption expenditures for untreated
and treated households approximately a year and a half after the initial transfers. Local
firms do not show meaningful increases in investment, and there is minimal local price
inflation, with quite precisely estimated effects of far less than 1% on average across a wide
range of goods. Taken together, two different empirical approaches – using consumption
data and income data – both yield an estimated local fiscal multiplier of 2.5 to 2.8, and the
hypothesis that the multipliers are less than or equal to 1 is rejected with 90% confidence.
This multiplier is somewhat larger than recent estimates of 1.5-2.0 from the United States.
Several suggestive patterns in the data are consistent with the existence of “slack” on the
supply side in our context, which can also help account for the large estimated multiplier.
Some authors working in the recent cash transfer literature in development economics
have been concerned about the possibility that large-scale programs like the one we study
could lead to a range of adverse consequences for non-beneficiaries. However, these concerns
are not supported by our results. The consumption expenditures of untreated households
and revenues of firms rise substantially in areas receiving large cash transfers; there is lit-
tle to no price inflation; overall income, consumption and asset inequality do not increase
meaningfully in treated areas; nor are there negative effects in terms of domestic violence,
health, education, and local public goods. An important further implication of our finding
of, if anything, positive spillover effects along a number of important dimensions, includ-
ing consumption, is that RCTs of cash transfer programs that simply compare outcomes in
treatment versus control villages may be understating true overall impacts by ignoring the
general equilibrium effects that we capture (along the lines that Miguel and Kremer (2004)
argue in the context of a health program).
This study is among the first, to our knowledge, to exploit randomized controlled trial
methods to directly estimate macroeconomic parameters and more broadly capture large-
scale aggregate effects of a development program. The parameter we focus on here – the fiscal
multiplier – has been the subject of intense interest since at least the seminal work of Keynes
(1936). In studying it using an RCT, we provide a novel counter-example to some well-known
critiques of RCT methods in development economics, including by Bardhan (2005), Easterly
(2006), and Deaton (2010), who have claimed that experimental methods are not well-suited
to studying the ‘big’ questions in economics. In doing so, we hope to demonstrate that there
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need not be a trade-off between a study’s rigor and its relevance: economics research can
increasingly achieve both (Muralidharan and Niehaus 2017; Burke, Bergquist, and Miguel
2019).
The extent to which the multiplier results apply to other settings merits further dis-
cussion. It seems natural that the findings would be particularly relevant for other low or
middle income economies that share structural and institutional features with Kenya, includ-
ing many other African settings. One open question is the extent to which the relatively large
estimated multiplier is driven by the targeting of transfers to the poorest rural households.
It is plausible that spillover effects would be more muted if the program were targeted to
better-off households, who would likely have a lower marginal propensity to consume out of
a one-time transfer. Thus, the distribution of spending capacity could have implications for
aggregate output. An especially noteworthy feature of our study setting is the fact that we
estimate a large multiplier even during a period when the Kenyan economy was experiencing
steady economic growth, rather than a recession. Hence it appears that any under-utilization
of supply side capacity is not simply temporary or cyclical in rural Kenya, but rather may be
more persistent. A recent body of research argues that there may be a related phenomenon
of steady-state “liquidity traps” or “secular stagnation” in advanced economies as well (e.g.,
Rachel and Summers 2019, Mian, Straub, and Sufi 2019).
A traditional perspective would be that, once a local aggregate demand shock (like the
cash transfers in our study) ends, the economy would eventually return to the previous
steady-state. However, other theoretical perspectives from international trade, economic
geography, and development (e.g., Marshall 1890, Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Krugman 1980,
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989), as well as the liquidity traps literature mentioned above,
would suggest there could be persistent local effects of a temporary cash infusion, due to
agglomeration effects, increasing returns, changes in income inequality, market structure
and firm specialization, and even shifts in the social networks of traders and suppliers.
Temporary cash transfers and other forms of assistance have also been shown to have effects
on long-run human capital accumulation and earnings in low income settings (Bouguen
et al. 2019; Baird et al. 2016). An evaluation of long-run patterns of economic activity,
firm dynamics, migration, and household living standards in the sample communities would
provide a valuable and novel experimental empirical test of these theories.
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Figure 1: Study design and timeline
(a) Randomization
(b) Timing relative to experimental start
Baseline census (hh & ent)
Baseline survey (hh & ent)
First GD transfer
Second GD transfer
Third GD transfer
Market price survey
Enterprise phone survey
Household endline survey
Enterprise endline survey
0 6 12 18 24 30
Timing relative to experimental start
Notes: Panel A illustrates the two-level randomized controlled trial experimental design. 653 villages were grouped into 68
saturation groups based on the sublocation (the administrative unit directly above the village level) in which they are located.
Saturation groups were then randomly assigned to either high or low saturation status. In the 33 high saturation groups,
two-thirds of villages were assigned to treatment status, while in the 35 low saturation groups, one-third of villages are assigned
to treatment status. In the 328 treatment villages, all eligible households received an unconditional cash transfer, while no
households within control villages received a transfer. Panel B plots the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles of study
activities. Timing is reported relative to the anticipated start of activities in each village (the “experimental start”). The
experimental start for a village is calculated based on the random ordering of treatment and control villages that both GD and
research team field enumerators worked in, as well as GD’s mean monthly pace of enrolling villages in the subcounty in which
the village is located. As markets were not assigned to treatment, we use the first date transfers were distributed within the
subcounty in which the market is located. The value of the first GD transfer is USD 151 PPP, while the second and third are
both USD 860 PPP.
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Figure 2: Study area
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Notes: This figure plots study villages, sublocation boundaries, and weekly markets in the study area in Siaya County, Kenya.
Control villages are denoted by hollow circles, treatment villages are denoted by solid circles, and blue stars indicate the
locations of markets. High saturation sublocations are shaded in gray, while low saturation sublocations are those in white.
Town boundaries are shaded with diagonal lines.
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Figure 3: Fiscal multiplier over time
Panel A: Expenditure multiplier
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Panel B: Income multiplier
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Notes: Both expenditure and fiscal multipliers broken down by components and over time. Panel A shows the expenditure
multiplier over the first 27 months after start of the transfers. The upper graph reports the total multiplier impulse response
function each quarter as a thick black line. Colored areas below the curve represent the different components of expenditure.
Note that some components turn negative from time to time, leading to some areas to overlap, which is indicated by darker
shading. Standard errors around the joint multiplier estimates are obtained by 2000 replications of the wild bootstrap and
reported as brackets of ˘1SE. The integral under the multiplier curve adds up to our main multiplier estimate of 2.46. The
bottom graph of Panel A traces out this integral over time. It also prints ˘1SE confidence intervals around the cumulative
estimate at each quarter, obtained by 2000 bootstrap replications. Panel B repeats the same exercise for the income multiplier.
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Table 1: Expenditures, Savings and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated Households Untreated Households
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
mean (SD)
Panel A: Expenditure
Household expenditure, annualized 292.98˚˚˚ 343.34˚˚˚ 333.66˚˚˚ 2,536.86
(60.09) (112.02) (123.22) (1,934.09)
Non-durable expenditure, annualized 174.99˚˚˚ 211.90˚˚ 288.46˚˚˚ 2,402.43
(55.41) (96.75) (111.44) (1,801.59)
Food expenditure, annualized 71.61˚ 138.57˚˚ 132.81˚˚ 1,578.43
(36.93) (66.75) (58.57) (1,072.31)
Temptation goods expenditure, annualized 6.51 4.48 −0.71 37.10
(5.79) (9.17) (6.50) (123.59)
Durable expenditure, annualized 95.18˚˚˚ 106.29˚˚˚ 8.40 59.44
(12.64) (21.44) (12.50) (230.90)
Panel B: Assets
Assets (non-land, non-house), net borrowing 178.47˚˚˚ 174.10˚˚˚ 132.63˚ 1,132.15
(24.63) (47.09) (78.31) (1,420.22)
Housing value 377.14˚˚˚ 390.59˚˚˚ 78.93 2,033.72
(26.37) (40.29) (215.76) (5,030.37)
Land value 49.50 112.92 543.71 5,030.72
(186.30) (277.47) (459.46) (6,607.61)
Panel C: Household balance sheet
Household income, annualized 77.62˚ 131.48 229.42˚˚˚ 1,023.45
(43.66) (100.78) (88.58) (1,634.70)
Net value of household transfers received, annualized −1.68 −11.49 8.75 130.18
(6.81) (13.78) (19.10) (263.75)
Tax paid, annualized 1.81 −0.18 1.90 16.93
(1.28) (2.13) (1.93) (36.51)
Profits (ag & non-ag), annualized 28.61 32.15 44.09 485.20
(23.75) (54.31) (45.05) (787.10)
Wage earnings, annualized 42.52 73.15 182.24˚˚˚ 495.37
(32.24) (64.23) (65.54) (1,231.56)
Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for treatment village from a regression using data from eligible households (as classified by the GE census team),
and includes an indicator for saturation status of the sublocation. Column 2 reports the total effect on treated households (eligible recipients) from the “optimal” IV spatial
regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita to a household’s own village v (instrumented by village treatment status), and to villages other than v
in each 2km radii band around the household (instrumented by the share of eligible households assigned to treatment in villages other than v inside the buffer). For this
analysis, the sample is restricted to eligible households, including between 5,372 and 5,424 observations. Column 3 presents the average spillover effect on eligible households
in control villages as well as ineligible households (5,448 to 5,509 observations), coming from a stacked spatial regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per
capita GDP to each 2km radii band around each household (instrumented by the share of eligibles assigned to treatment in each buffer). The reported average effect comes
from a population-share-weighted average effect experienced by those two groups, and is representative of the average untreated household. The number of radii bands
included in columns 2 and 3 is chosen, as pre-specified, by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the weighted mean and standard deviations of the outcome variables
in low-saturation control villages (across eligible and ineligible households). Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights and contains baseline values of the
outcome when available. Standard errors are clustered at the sublocation in column 1, and calculated following Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel out to 10 km
in columns 2 and 3. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table 2: Input Prices and Quantities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated Households Untreated Households
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
mean (SD)
Panel A: Labor
Hourly wage earned by employees 0.11˚˚˚ 0.03 0.19˚ 0.70
(0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.89)
Household total hours worked, last 7 days 2.44 1.43 −4.70 63.20
(1.71) (3.89) (3.17) (54.14)
Panel B: Land
Land price per acre 166.84 346.75 556.73 3,952.86
(201.20) (304.27) (412.26) (3,148.52)
Acres of land owned −0.19 −0.07 0.08 1.42
(0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (2.37)
Panel C: Capital
Loan-weighted interest rate, monthly −0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07)
Total loan amount 5.55 2.22 6.09 80.61
(4.95) (9.18) (13.23) (204.36)
Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for treatment village from a regression using data from eligible households (as classified by the GE
census team), and includes an indicator for saturation status of the sublocation. Column 2 reports the total effect on treated households (eligible recipients)
from the “optimal” IV spatial regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita to a household’s own village v (instrumented by village treatment
status), and to villages other than v in each 2km radii band around the household (instrumented by the share of eligible households assigned to treatment in
villages other than v inside the buffer). For this analysis, the sample is restricted to eligible households, including between 2,828 and 5,423 observations for
variables at the household level, and 2,832 observations at the individual level for wages. Column 3 presents the average spillover effect on eligible households
in control villages as well as ineligible households, coming from a stacked spatial regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita GDP to
each 2km radii band around each household (instrumented by the share of eligibles assigned to treatment in each buffer). We have between 2,781 to 5,509
observations at the household level and 2,391 wage observations at the individual level. The reported average effect comes from a population-share-weighted
average effect experienced by those two groups, and is representative of the average untreated household. The number of radii bands included in columns 2 and
3 is chosen, as pre-specified, by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the weighted mean and standard deviations of the outcome variables in low-saturation
control villages (across eligible and ineligible households). Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights and contains baseline values of the outcome
when available. In addition, prices are quantity-weighted. That is, wages are weighted by the number of hours worked, land prices by the number of acres
purchased, and interest rates by size of each loan. Standard errors are clustered at the sublocation in column 1, and calculated following Conley (1999), 2008
using a uniform kernel out to 10 km in columns 2 and 3. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table 3: Enterprise Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Villages Control Villages
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
weighted mean (SD)
Panel A: All enterprises
Enterprise profits, annualized 15.76 68.13 31.21 322.91
(23.51) (44.48) (41.18) (691.28)
Enterprise revenue, annualized 5.93 348.10˚˚ 230.98˚˚ 757.56
(94.49) (143.24) (106.88) (2,499.92)
Enterprise costs, annualized −9.47 98.42˚˚ 79.96˚ 147.39
(29.19) (42.21) (44.68) (550.78)
Enterprise wagebill, annualized −12.69 85.16˚˚ 73.08˚ 120.24
(26.19) (37.51) (41.29) (492.65)
Enterprise profit margin 0.01 −0.05˚˚ −0.06˚˚˚ 0.44
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.61)
Panel B: Non-agricultural enterprises
Enterprise inventory 10.85 34.69˚˚ 17.06 193.87
(9.12) (14.46) (10.48) (505.65)
Enterprise investment, annualized 4.05 13.38 6.69 179.49
(7.08) (15.54) (8.70) (644.15)
Panel C: Village-level
Number of enterprises 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.12
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.14)
Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for treatment village, and includes an indicator for saturation status of the sublocation.
Column 2 reports the total effect on enterprises in treatment villages (own-village effect plus across-village spillover) from the “optimal” IV spatial
regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita to a enterprise’s own village v (instrumented by village treatment status), and
to villages other than v in each 2km radii band around the enterprise (instrumented by the share of eligible households assigned to treatment in
villages other than v inside the buffer). Column 3 reports the total effect on enterprises in control villages (across-village spillover only). For each
column, we stack 3 separate regressions for own-farm enterprises, non-agricultural enterprises operated within the household, and non-agricultural
enterprises operated outside the household, due to our independent sampling across these enterprise categories. We have between 10,015 and
10,284 observations for all enterprises, and 2,414 to 2,423 for variables we collect for non-ag enterprises only. The number of radii bands included
in columns 2 and 3 is chosen, as pre-specified, by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the weighted mean and standard deviations of the
outcome variables in low-saturation control villages (across all enterprise categories). Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights and
contains village-level baseline averages of the outcome variable by enterprise category when available. For monetary values, we convert effects
to a per-household level by multiplying the average effect in each enterprise category by the number of enterprises in that category, dividing by
the number of households in our study area, and summing over all enterprise categories. For the number of enterprises, we run regressions at
the village level, where the outcome is the number of enterprises per household in each category, we weight by the number of households in each
village and sum up over all enterprise categories. For the profit margin, we weight the effects across all enterprise categories by their share in
the economy, and across each enterprise by revenue, so that our estimate represents the effect on the revenue-weighted average enterprise in the
economy. Standard errors are clustered at the sublocation in column 1, and calculated following Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel out
to 10 km in columns 2 and 3. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table 4: Output Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Effects (in %) ATE by market access (in %)
ATE
Average maximum
effect (AME) below median above median
All goods 0.13˚˚ 0.54˚ 0.19˚˚ 0.10
(0.06) (0.30) (0.09) (0.07)
By tradability Tradables 0.02 0.18 0.10 0.02
(0.09) (0.67) (0.16) (0.08)
Non-tradables 0.12˚˚ 0.52 0.20˚ 0.04
(0.06) (0.32) (0.11) (0.07)
By sector Food items 0.13˚˚ 0.55˚ 0.21˚ 0.05
(0.06) (0.33) (0.11) (0.08)
Non-durables 0.03 0.22 0.16 0.01
(0.11) (0.79) (0.19) (0.10)
Durables 0.00 0.03 −0.12 0.06
(0.08) (0.59) (0.11) (0.09)
Livestock −0.09 −0.29 −0.08˚ −0.17
(0.10) (0.50) (0.04) (0.19)
Temptation goods −0.22 −1.60 −0.14 −0.27
(0.19) (1.37) (0.28) (0.20)
Notes: Each row represents a regression of the logarithm of a price index (multiplied by 100) on the “optimal” number of lags
and distance buffers of per capita Give Directly transfers in each buffer. For each price index, we include a balanced panel of 1,586
market-by-month observations. The number of radii bands and lags is chosen sequentially by minimizing the BIC, as pre-specified.
Regressions include a full set of market and month fixed effects. Column 1 reports the implied ATE, calculated by evaluating the
“optimal” regression specification at the average level of treatment intensity between September 2014 and March 2017, the time
during which transfers went out. Column 2 reports the average maximum effect, calculated at the average across all markets of
the month in which the largest per capita transfers went into a market’s neighborhood (up to the largest buffer selected by the
algorithm). Columns 3 and 4 break down the ATE by market access, defined as MAm “ ř10r“0 r´θNr, where θ “ 8 and Nr is the
population in in the r´ 2 to r km buffer around each market. Standard errors (in parentheses) are as in Conley (1999, 2008) and
we allow for spatial correlation up to 10km and autocorrelation up to 12 months. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct.,
and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table 5: Fiscal Multiplier Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
M
Estimate
H0: M ă 0
p-value
H0: M ă 1
p-value
Panel A: Expenditure multiplier 2.53 0.05˚ 0.17
(1.55)
Household consumption 1.55
Household assets 0.42
Enterprise investment 0.47
Enterprise inventory 0.08
Panel B: Income multiplier 2.81 0.07˚ 0.18
(1.90)
Household wage bill 1.00
Enterprise profits 1.68
Enterprise capital income 0.09
Enterprise taxes paid 0.04
Panel C: Both multipliers
Average of both estimates 2.67 0.04˚˚ 0.14
(1.52)
Joint test of both multipliers 0.02˚˚ 0.07˚
Notes: Results from joint estimation of expenditure and income multipliers. Column (1)
reports point estimates of both multipliers and their respective components. Each compo-
nent is estimated individually and the multiplier is obtained by aggregating components as
described in the main text. Effects of the cash infusion on flow variables (consumption, in-
vestment, wages, profits, capital income, and taxes) are obtained by dynamically estimating
effect sizes over the first 29 months after the first transfer and computing the integral un-
der this curve. Effects on remaining stock variables are approximated by the total endline
treatment effect. Standard errors are computed by 2,000 replications of a wild clustered
bootstrap, which re-allocates within-sublocation Rademacher-perturbed residuals from the
main population regressions to fitted outcome values to create perturbed samples. Columns
(2) and (3) conduct one-sided tests of each estimate by counting the number of times the
wild bootstrap produced an estimate complying with the null hypotheses and compute p-
values as the fraction the null was satisfied. Panel C conducts two tests regarding both
multipliers. The first row computes the average of both estimates and conducts tests on
this average in much the same bootstrapped fashion as above. Finally, the last row reports
p-values from joint tests against the same nulls, following an identical procedure. Appendix
table F.2 additionally reports standard errors and bootstrapped p-values for all subcompo-
nents of each multiplier. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct.
level.
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Table 6: Non-market Outcomes and Externalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated Households Untreated Households
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
mean (SD)
Psychological well-being index 0.09˚˚˚ 0.12˚ 0.08 0.01
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (1.01)
Health index 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (1.01)
Food security index 0.10˚˚˚ 0.08 0.08 0.01
(0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (1.00)
Children food security 0.13˚˚˚ 0.17˚˚ 0.09 −0.04
(0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (1.12)
Education index 0.09˚˚ 0.10˚ 0.10˚ 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (1.02)
Female empowerment index −0.01 −0.13 0.09 0.05
(0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.94)
Security index 0.11˚˚˚ −0.02 −0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.96)
Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for treatment village from a regression using data from eligible households (as classified by
the GE census team), and includes an indicator for saturation status of the sublocation. Column 2 reports the total effect on treated households
(eligible recipients) from the “optimal” IV spatial regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita to a household’s own village
v (instrumented by village treatment status), and to villages other than v in each 2km radii band around the household (instrumented by the
share of eligible households assigned to treatment in villages other than v inside the buffer). For this analysis, the sample is restricted to eligible
households, including between 4,121 and and 5,423 observations (and a subset of 1,118 for female empowerment). Column 3 presents the average
spillover effect on eligible households in control villages as well as ineligible households, coming from a stacked spatial regression of each outcome
on the amount transferred per capita GDP to each 2km radii band around each household (instrumented by the share of eligibles assigned to
treatment in each buffer). We have between 4,048 and 5,309 observations (and a subset of 978 for female empowerment). The reported average
effect comes from a population-share-weighted average effect experienced by those two groups, and is representative of the average untreated
household. The number of radii bands included in columns 2 and 3 is chosen, as pre-specified, by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the
weighted mean and standard deviations of the outcome variables in low-saturation control villages (across eligible and ineligible households).
Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights and contains baseline values of the outcome when available. Standard errors are clustered
at the sublocation in column 1, and calculated following Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel out to 10 km in columns 2 and 3. * denotes
significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Figure A.1: Non-linear Spillover Estimates
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Notes: Each panel represents a reduced-form regression of household consumption and enterprise revenue on 5 quantile bins of
the share of eligibles assigned to treatment 2km around each household / enterprise. Effects are relative to the lowest quantile.
For consumption, we control for direct effects by including eligibility and a dummy for treatment status of each household. For
enterprises, we include interactions with dummies for 3 enterprise types (within homestead, outside homestead, and own-farm).
We then sum and weight coefficients to obtain total revenue effects per household in our study area. In both regressions, we
control for baseline values of the outcome (at the village level for enterprises), and use inverse sampling weights. 95% confidence
intervals are obtained using Conley (1999, 2008). Dashed lines start at zero, the slope coming from the same regression, with
quantile bins of treatment intensity replaced by a linear term (and weighted across enterprise types as above). We cannot
formally reject that our estimated non-linear regression is linear, i.e. that βˆ2´βˆ1
∆X2
“ ... “ βˆn´βˆn´1
∆Xn
: The p-values of this test
are 0.97 and 0.1 for consumption and revenue respectively. We did the same test for all 10 pre-specified primary outcomes and
treated / untreated households separately: we cannot reject linearity at the 10% level for any of them.
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Figure A.2: Little heterogeneity in pre-specified primary outcomes
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Notes: This figure presents estimates for treatment effect heterogeneity for eligible households in pre-specified primary outcomes
along 6 pre-specified dimensions of heterogeneity (Haushofer et al. 2017a). Each plotted coefficient is from a separate regression.
Each row represents a separate primary outcome; the mean (SD) for eligible households in control, low saturation villages is
reported below the outcome label. The first column (Treatment Village) plots estimated effects for the coefficient on an
indicator for being in a treatment village from Equation (1), where the sample is restricted to eligible households. Columns
2 through 8 plot the coefficient on the interaction term of the listed baseline covariate with the treatment village indicator;
this interaction term and baseline covariate are added to Equation (1). Values in parentheses on the x-axis denote the mean
of the baseline covariate. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Reported significance levels correspond to FDR
q-values, calculated following Anderson (2008) and Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli (2006). ˚ denotes significance at 10 pct.,
˚˚ denotes significance at 5 pct., and ˚˚˚ denotes significance at 1 pct. level.
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Figure A.3: Output prices by market access
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Notes: Each panel represents a regression of the logarithm of a price index (multiplied by 100) on the “optimal” number of
lags and distance buffers of per capita Give Directly transfers in each buffer. The number of radii bands and lags is chosen
sequentially by minimizing the BIC, as pre-specified. Regressions include a full set of market and month fixed effects. We report
the implied ATE, calculated by evaluating the “optimal” regression specification at the average level of treatment intensity
between September 2014 and March 2017, the time during which transfers went out. Bold markers correspond to the ATE
across all markets. Hollow markers break down this average by quartiles of market access (with low market access referring to
more remote markets), defined as MAm “ ř10r“0 r´θNr, where θ “ 8 and Nr is the population in in the r ´ 2 to r km buffer
around each market. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors as in Conley (1999, 2008), where we
allow for spatial correlation up to 10km and autocorrelation up to 12 months.
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Table A.1: Coefficient estimates for Expenditures, Savings and Income
Treated households Untreated households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Amt Own Village
IV
Amt Other Villages
0-2km
IV
Amt Other Villages
2-4km
IV
Amount, Control Eligibles
0-2km
IV
Amount, Ineligibles
0-2km
IV
Control, low-saturation
mean (SD)
Panel A: Expenditure
Household expenditure, annualized 292.98˚˚˚ 1,170.26˚˚˚ 423.50 267.13 4,445.60˚˚˚ 2,536.86
(60.09) (233.14) (1,048.61) (1,059.61) (1,602.35) (1,934.09)
Non-durable expenditure, annualized 174.99˚˚˚ 713.01˚˚˚ 287.95 153.34 3,859.66˚˚˚ 2,402.43
(55.41) (203.62) (906.14) (926.76) (1,462.70) (1,801.59)
Food expenditure, annualized 71.61˚ 357.86˚˚˚ 499.56 134.66 1,763.65˚˚ 1,578.43
(36.93) (130.24) (610.30) (633.63) (772.58) (1,072.31)
Temptation goods expenditure, annualized 6.51 22.85 −16.29 134.74 −37.80 37.10
(5.79) (22.15) (98.51) (101.42) (84.49) (123.59)
Durable expenditure, annualized 95.18˚˚˚ 368.58˚˚˚ 113.05 71.86 98.31 59.44
(12.64) (58.11) (206.60) (212.93) (162.48) (230.90)
Panel B: Assets
Assets (non-land, non-house), net borrowing 178.47˚˚˚ 674.43˚˚˚ −17.87 −155.20 1,821.91˚ 1,132.15
(24.63) (89.33) (405.33) (505.06) (1,062.34) (1,420.22)
Housing value 377.14˚˚˚ 1,478.15˚˚˚ 854.28˚˚ −958.36˚˚ 340.02 993.58 2,033.72
(26.37) (90.05) (402.23) (472.86) (472.25) (2,907.51) (5,030.37)
Land value 49.50 294.47 398.87 2,412.59 6,829.64 5,030.72
(186.30) (469.79) (3,161.25) (3,682.78) (5,915.88) (6,607.61)
Panel C: Household balance sheet
Household income, annualized 77.62˚ 333.85˚ 490.42 1,027.92 2,879.66˚˚ 1,023.45
(43.66) (190.49) (807.05) (751.08) (1,171.65) (1,634.70)
Net value of household transfers received, annualized −1.68 −8.90 −101.13 −86.37 136.16 130.18
(6.81) (26.50) (121.41) (129.95) (251.15) (263.75)
Tax paid, annualized 1.81 6.54 −20.76 −7.97 27.27 16.93
(1.28) (4.54) (21.53) (20.55) (25.03) (36.51)
Profits (ag & non-ag), annualized 28.61 129.93 −18.82 −133.83 622.88 485.20
(23.75) (99.36) (439.12) (493.77) (604.77) (787.10)
Wage earnings, annualized 42.52 197.40 239.34 1,138.82˚˚ 2,219.89˚˚ 495.37
(32.24) (121.59) (587.88) (494.91) (869.57) (1,231.56)
¯Amt 0.26 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates that go into the average effects reported in Table 1, see corresponding table note for more details. ¯Amt reports the average of each RHS variable (which we multiply with the coefficient to get the
average effect).
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Table A.2: Household Assets by Productivity Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated Households Untreated Households
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
mean (SD)
Assets (non-land, non-house), net borrowing 178.47˚˚˚ 174.10˚˚˚ 132.63˚ 1,132.15
(24.63) (47.09) (78.31) (1,420.22)
Productive Agricultural Assets 4.26˚˚˚ 3.81˚ −0.38 32.51
(0.93) (2.08) (2.47) (38.94)
Potentially Productive Assets 90.74˚˚˚ 54.16 50.49 700.68
(22.96) (44.21) (53.61) (1,025.41)
Livestock Assets 50.61˚˚˚ 37.00 −7.01 462.24
(17.04) (28.97) (35.75) (723.43)
Non-Ag Assets 37.03˚˚˚ 21.36 25.63 219.04
(10.43) (23.82) (23.15) (424.05)
Non-Productive Assets 78.81˚˚˚ 93.46˚˚˚ 52.32˚ 449.30
(9.28) (15.68) (29.59) (468.64)
Notes: This table presents results on household asset ownership based on classifications of assets by productivity status. Productive agricultural assets include
agricultural tools. Potentially productive assets include livestock and non-agricultural assets, made up of the following: bicycle, motorcycle, car, boat, kerosene
stove, sewing machine electric iron, computer, mobile phone, car battery, solar (panels or system), and generators. Non-productive assets include: radio/cd
player, kerosene lantern, bed, mattress, bednet, table, sofa, chair, cupboards, clock, television, iron sheets. Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for
treatment village from a regression using data from eligible households (as classified by the GE census team), and includes an indicator for saturation status of
the sublocation. Column 2 reports the total effect on treated households (eligible recipients) from the “optimal” IV spatial regression of each outcome on the
amount transferred per capita to a household’s own village v (instrumented by village treatment status), and to villages other than v in each 2km radii band
around the household (instrumented by the share of eligible households assigned to treatment in villages other than v inside the buffer). For this analysis, the
sample is restricted to eligible households, including 5,420 observations. Column 3 presents the average spillover effect on eligible households in control villages
as well as ineligible households, coming from a stacked spatial regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita GDP to each 2km radii band
around each household (instrumented by the share of eligibles assigned to treatment in each buffer). We have 5,505 observations. The reported average effect
comes from a population-share-weighted average effect experienced by those two groups, and is representative of the average untreated household. The number
of radii bands included in columns 2 and 3 is chosen, as pre-specified, by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the weighted mean and standard deviations of
the outcome variables in low-saturation control villages (across eligible and ineligible households). Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights and
contains baseline values of the outcome when available. Standard errors are clustered at the village level in column 1, and calculated following Conley (1999),
2008 using a uniform kernel out to 10 km in columns 2 and 3. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A.3: Enterprise revenue effects by sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Villages Control Villages
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
weighted mean (SD)
Retail revenue 73.88˚ 132.63˚ 53.72 234.83
(42.10) (75.60) (57.37) (413.76)
Manufacturing revenue −24.69 107.40˚˚ 105.30˚ 81.68
(49.14) (51.70) (58.78) (178.40)
Services revenue −73.65˚ 13.64 47.65 115.27
(39.60) (46.15) (30.38) (176.55)
Agriculture revenue 20.58 45.25˚ 19.19 308.01
(13.91) (24.36) (20.21) (365.14)
Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for treatment village, and includes an indicator for saturation status
of the sublocation. Column 2 reports the total effect on enterprises in treatment villages (own-village effect plus across-village
spillover) from the “optimal” IV spatial regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita to a enterprise’s own
village v (instrumented by village treatment status), and to villages other than v in each 2km radii band around the enterprise
(instrumented by the share of eligible households assigned to treatment in villages other than v inside the buffer). Column
3 reports the total effect on enterprises in control villages (across-village spillover only). For non-agricultural sectors (retail,
services and manufacturing), we stack 2 separate regressions for non-agricultural enterprises operated within the household, and
non-agricultural enterprises operated outside the household, due to our independent sampling across these enterprise categories.
We have 1,531 observations for retail enterprises, 481 for manufacturing, 268 for services and 7,916 for agriculture. The number
of radii bands included in columns 2 and 3 is chosen, as pre-specified, by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the weighted
mean and standard deviations of the outcome variables in low-saturation control villages (across all enterprise categories).
Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights and contains village-level baseline averages of the outcome variable
by enterprise category when available. We convert effects to a per-household level by multiplying the average effect in each
enterprise category by the number of enterprises in that category, dividing by the number of households in our study area, and
summing over all enterprise categories. Standard errors are clustered at the village level in column 1, and calculated following
Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel out to 10 km in columns 2 and 3. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and
*** at 1 pct. level.
A-6
Table A.4: Enterprise outcomes by owner eligibility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated Owners Untreated Owners
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
weighted mean (SD)
Panel A: All enterprises
Enterprise profits, annualized 10.00 30.07 52.61˚˚ 322.91
(13.30) (21.60) (23.92) (691.28)
Enterprise revenue, annualized 72.53˚˚˚ 160.75 213.63˚˚˚ 757.56
(26.60) (103.04) (46.35) (2,499.92)
Enterprise costs, annualized 27.36˚˚˚ 38.32˚ 46.33˚˚ 147.39
(9.56) (20.27) (18.44) (550.78)
Enterprise wagebill, annualized 23.77˚˚˚ 35.16˚ 44.39˚˚ 120.24
(8.76) (19.00) (17.83) (492.65)
Enterprise profit margin −0.04˚˚ −0.09˚˚˚ −0.02 0.44
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.61)
Panel B: Non-agricultural enterprises
Enterprise inventory 2.84 8.04 5.40 193.87
(2.80) (7.46) (5.53) (505.65)
Enterprise investment, annualized −5.09 −17.41 5.41 179.49
(5.38) (17.45) (8.27) (644.15)
Panel C: Village-level
Number of enterprises 0.00 0.03˚˚ 0.00 1.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14)
Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for treatment village, and includes an indicator for saturation status of the sublocation,
among matched eligible enterprise owners. Column 2 reports the total effect on enterprises with a treated owner relative to eligible owners in control
villages (own-village effect plus across-village spillover) from the “optimal” IV spatial regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per
capita to a enterprise’s own village v (instrumented by village treatment status), and to villages other than v in each 2km radii band around the
enterprise (instrumented by the share of eligible households assigned to treatment in villages other than v inside the buffer). We have between 6,120
and 6,286 owner-matched observations for all enterprises, and 1,150 to 1,154 for non-ag outcomes. Column 3 reports the total effect on enterprises
with untreated owners (spillover only), where we have between 6,596 observations for all enterprises, and 1,472 to 1,477 for non-ag outcomes.
For each column, we stack 3 separate regressions for own-farm enterprises, non-agricultural enterprises operated within the household, and non-
agricultural enterprises operated outside the household, due to our independent sampling across these enterprise categories. The number of radii
bands included in columns 2 and 3 is chosen, as pre-specified, by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the weighted mean and standard deviations
of the outcome variables in low-saturation control villages (across all enterprise categories). Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights
and contains village-level baseline averages of the outcome variable by enterprise category when available. We convert effects to a per-household level
by multiplying the average effect in each enterprise category by the number of enterprises in that category, dividing by the number of households in
our study area, and summing over all enterprise categories. Standard errors are clustered at the village level in column 1, and calculated following
Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel out to 10 km in columns 2 and 3. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A.5: Input prices and quantities: additional labor supply outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated Households Untreated Households
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
mean (SD)
Panel A: Quantities
Household hours worked on own farm 2.07˚ 1.13 −6.27˚˚ 35.33
(1.15) (2.43) (2.61) (38.81)
Individual hours worked in self-employment 1.80 5.19˚˚ −1.37 26.80
(1.14) (2.15) (1.76) (23.54)
Individual hours employed last week 0.52 −2.04 2.49 23.62
(0.98) (2.47) (2.67) (25.96)
Individual hours employed last week in agriculture −1.54˚˚˚ −2.02˚˚˚ 0.33 6.01
(0.56) (0.78) (1.11) (12.78)
Individual hours employed last week not in agriculture 1.67 −0.23 1.91 17.09
(1.03) (2.46) (2.65) (26.41)
Panel B: Prices
Hourly wage earned by employees 0.11˚˚˚ 0.03 0.19˚ 0.70
(0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.89)
Hourly wage earned by employees in agriculture 0.15˚˚ 0.23˚˚˚ −0.06 0.67
(0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.67)
Hourly wage earned by employees not in agriculture 0.04 0.06 0.20 1.09
(0.08) (0.11) (0.23) (1.45)
Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for treatment village from a regression using data from eligible households (as classified by the GE census team),
and includes an indicator for saturation status of the sublocation. Column 2 reports the total effect on treated households (eligible recipients) from the “optimal” IV spatial
regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita to a household’s own village v (instrumented by village treatment status), and to villages other than v in
each 2km radii band around the household (instrumented by the share of eligible households assigned to treatment in villages other than v inside the buffer). For this analysis,
the sample is restricted to eligible households, including between 5,420 observations at the household level, and between 1,201 and 4,085 observations for individual-level
outcomes. Column 3 presents the average spillover effect on eligible households in control villages as well as ineligible households, coming from a stacked spatial regression
of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita GDP to each 2km radii band around each household (instrumented by the share of eligibles assigned to treatment in
each buffer). We have between 5,505 household observations, and between 1,019 and 3,486 individuals. The reported average effect comes from a population-share-weighted
average effect experienced by those two groups, and is representative of the average untreated household. The number of radii bands included in columns 2 and 3 is chosen,
as pre-specified, by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the weighted mean and standard deviations of the outcome variables in low-saturation control villages (across
eligible and ineligible households). Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights and contains baseline values of the outcome when available. In addition, prices
are quantity-weighted. That is, wages are weighted by the number of hours worked. Standard errors are clustered at the sublocation in column 1, and calculated following
Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel out to 10 km in columns 2 and 3. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A.6: Input prices and quantities: additional land outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated Households Untreated Households
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
mean (SD)
Acres of land owned −0.19 −0.07 0.08 1.42
(0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (2.37)
Acres of land rented out −0.04 −0.05 0.06 0.93
(0.11) (0.21) (0.18) (0.91)
Acres of land rented in 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.70
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.64)
Acres of land used for crops 0.03 −0.03 0.08 0.96
(0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (1.18)
Land price per acre 166.84 346.75 556.73 3,952.86
(201.20) (304.27) (412.26) (3,148.52)
Monthly land rental price per acre −0.05 −0.38 1.76 9.71
(0.57) (0.96) (1.38) (8.33)
Total ag land rental costs 6.86˚˚˚ 9.19˚ 10.69 51.76
(2.41) (5.06) (9.26) (39.67)
Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for treatment village from a regression using data from eligible households (as classified by
the GE census team), and includes an indicator for saturation status of the sublocation. Column 2 reports the total effect on treated households
(eligible recipients) from the “optimal” IV spatial regression of each outcome on the amount transferred per capita to a household’s own village v
(instrumented by village treatment status), and to villages other than v in each 2km radii band around the household (instrumented by the share of
eligible households assigned to treatment in villages other than v inside the buffer). For this analysis, the sample is restricted to eligible households,
including between 352 and 5,418 observations (indicating land markets are often thin). Column 3 presents the average spillover effect on eligible
households in control villages as well as ineligible households, coming from a stacked spatial regression of each outcome on the amount transferred
per capita GDP to each 2km radii band around each household (instrumented by the share of eligibles assigned to treatment in each buffer). We have
between 348 and 5,505 observations. The reported average effect comes from a population-share-weighted average effect experienced by those two
groups, and is representative of the average untreated household. The number of radii bands included in columns 2 and 3 is chosen, as pre-specified,
by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the weighted mean and standard deviations of the outcome variables in low-saturation control villages
(across eligible and ineligible households). Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights and contains baseline values of the outcome when
available. In addition, prices are quantity-weighted. That is, land prices and rental rates are weighted by land size. Standard errors are clustered
at the sublocation in column 1, and calculated following Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel out to 10 km in columns 2 and 3. * denotes
significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A.7: Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Villages Control Villages
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Control, low saturation
weighted mean (SD)
Panel A: Expenditure
Gini coefficient 0.7 0.6 0.1 32.4
(0.7) (1.4) (1.1) (7.8)
Counterfactual Gini coefficient −1.1˚ −2.3˚ 0 32.4
(0.7) (1.3) (7.8)
P-value: effect = counterfactual effect p“0.08 p“0.06 p“0.92
Panel B: Assets
Gini coefficient −1.1 1.8 2.4˚ 45.4
(0.9) (1.6) (1.3) (10.1)
Counterfactual Gini coefficient −7.6˚˚˚ −6.6˚˚˚ 0 45.8
(0.8) (0.5) (10.8)
P-value: effect = counterfactual effect p“0.00 p“0.00 p“0.06
Notes: This table reports results on village level inequality as measured by Gini coefficients (0-100). Panel A presents expenditure-based Gini
coefficients and Panel B presents assets-based Gini coefficients. For each panel, the first row presents results on actual Gini coefficients measured
from our data. The second row estimates the same specifications as the first row, but using counterfactual Gini coefficients assuming that only
recipient households gained from the cash transfers, and untreated households experienced no spillovers. We construct a hypothetical consumption
and assets distribution by transferring its baseline distribution (for assets) or by imputing based on endline non-missing values in control and
low-saturation villages (for expenditure). We add in the associated gain, assuming recipients spend 66% of the transfer on consumption, and 34%
on assets. The p-value reported in the third row tests if the actual effect (row 1) equals the counterfactual effect (row 2). Gini estimates and
effect estimates are weighted by inverse sampling probabilities and village size. Standard errors are clustered at the village level in column 1, and
calculated following Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel out to 10 km in columns 2 and 3. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct.,
and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A.8: Expenditures, Savings and Income: Extended version
Treated households Untreated households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV Control Eligibles Ineligibles
Control, low-saturation
mean (SD)
Panel A: Expenditure
Household expenditure, annualized 292.98˚˚˚ 343.34˚˚˚ 333.66˚˚˚ 21.11 410.16˚˚˚ 2,536.86
(60.09) (112.02) (123.22) (83.75) (147.84) (1,934.09)
Non-durable expenditure, annualized 174.99˚˚˚ 211.90˚˚ 288.46˚˚˚ 12.12 356.10˚˚˚ 2,402.43
(55.41) (96.75) (111.44) (73.25) (134.95) (1,801.59)
Food expenditure, annualized 71.61˚ 138.57˚˚ 132.81˚˚ 10.64 162.72˚˚ 1,578.43
(36.93) (66.75) (58.57) (50.08) (71.28) (1,072.31)
Temptation goods expenditure, annualized 6.51 4.48 −0.71 10.65 −3.49 37.10
(5.79) (9.17) (6.50) (8.02) (7.80) (123.59)
Durable expenditure, annualized 95.18˚˚˚ 160.80˚˚˚ 8.40 5.68 9.07 59.44
(12.64) (23.92) (12.50) (16.83) (14.99) (230.90)
Panel B: Assets
Assets (non-land, non-house), net borrowing 178.47˚˚˚ 174.10˚˚˚ 132.63˚ −12.27 168.09˚ 1,132.15
(24.63) (47.09) (78.31) (39.92) (98.01) (1,420.22)
Housing value 377.14˚˚˚ 390.59˚˚˚ 78.93 26.87 91.67 2,033.72
(26.37) (40.29) (215.76) (37.33) (268.25) (5,030.37)
Land value 49.50 112.92 543.71 190.69 630.12 5,030.72
(186.30) (277.47) (459.46) (291.08) (545.82) (6,607.61)
Panel C: Household balance sheet
Household income, annualized 77.62˚ 131.48 229.42˚˚˚ 81.24 265.69˚˚ 1,023.45
(43.66) (100.78) (88.58) (59.36) (108.10) (1,634.70)
Net value of household transfers received, annualized −1.68 −11.49 8.75 −6.83 12.56 130.18
(6.81) (13.78) (19.10) (10.27) (23.17) (263.75)
Tax paid, annualized 1.81 −0.18 1.90 −0.63 2.52 16.93
(1.28) (2.13) (1.93) (1.62) (2.31) (36.51)
Profits (ag & non-ag), annualized 28.61 32.15 44.09 −10.58 57.47 485.20
(23.75) (54.31) (45.05) (39.03) (55.80) (787.10)
Wage earnings, annualized 42.52 73.15 182.24˚˚˚ 90.01˚˚ 204.81˚˚ 495.37
(32.24) (64.23) (65.54) (39.12) (80.23) (1,231.56)
Notes: See Table 1 for description of columns 1 to 3 and 6. Columns 4 and 5 report break out the total effects from column 3 separately for eligible households in control villages and ineligible
households (in both treatment and control villages), respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the village level in column 1, and calculated following Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel
out to 10 km in columns 2 - 5. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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B Details on study design and intervention
B.1 Cash transfer intervention
The NGO GiveDirectly (GD) provides cash transfers to poor households, and for the purposes
of this study, enrolled households with grass-thatched roofs in villages assigned to treatment.
GD worked on a rolling basis across villages in the study area. The village order was
randomized. GD’s enrollment process in treatment villages consisted of the following 6
steps:
1. Village meeting (baraza): Before beginning work in a village, GD held a meeting for
all households in the village to inform residents that GD would be working in their
village and explain the program and GD as an organization. To prevent gaming, the
eligibility criteria were not disclosed.
2. Census: GD staff then conducted a household census of the village, collecting names
of household members, contact information, and information about housing materials.
The information on housing materials was used to determine program eligibility.
3. Registration: Households identified as eligible based on the household census were vis-
ited by GD’s registration team. During these visits, GD staff confirmed the eligibility
of the household, informed the household of their eligibility, and registered the house-
hold for the program. Households could select the member that they wished to be
registered for the program. This visit was the point at which households learned they
would be receiving transfers, as well as the amount of the transfers, the transfer sched-
ule, and the fact that the transfer was unconditional.43 Households were instructed
and coached on how to register for M-Pesa, which was a prerequisite for being able
to receive transfers. Households that did not have a mobile phone were given the op-
tion to purchase one from GD staff, the cost of which was deducted from the transfer
amount.
4. Backcheck: All registered households were backchecked to confirm eligibility in advance
of transfers being sent. Importantly, the census, registration, and backcheck teams
consisted of separate staff members; this fact, and the multiple eligibility confirmations,
were security measures to prevent gaming by households and field staff.
5. Transfers: Transfers were made in a series of three payments via M-Pesa, according to
the following schedule: (i) A token transfer of KES 7,000 (USD 151 PPP) was sent once
a majority of eligible households within the village had completed their backchecks, to
ensure that the system was working properly, to ensure that the system was working
properly. (ii) Two months after the token transfer, a first large installment of KES
40,000 (USD 860 PPP) was sent. (iii) Six months later (eight months after the token
transfer), a second and final large installment of KES 40,000 was sent. If households
elected to receive a mobile phone from GD, this cost (KES 1600 or USD 34 PPP)
was subtracted from the second large installment. Transfers were typically sent at a
43. To emphasize the unconditional nature of the transfer, households were provided a brochure that listed
a large number of potential uses of the transfer.
B-1
single time per month (usually around the 15th) to all households scheduled to receive
transfers.
6. Follow-up: After transfers were sent, GD staff followed up by phone with transfer
recipients to ensure that transfers were received. In addition, recipients could contact
a GD helpline with questions. If GD staff learned that household conflicts had arisen
as a result of the transfers, transfers were occasionally delayed while these problems
were worked out.
GD generally began transfers to enrolled households within a village once 50 percent of
the eligible households (as identified in the census) had completed the enrollment process.
B.2 Randomization details
Villages were randomly assigned to treatment status following the two-level randomization
design described in Figure 1a. The randomization was conducted in two batches as GD
expanded its operations, with the first batch covering villages in Alego subcounty, and the
second batch covering villages in Ugunja and Ugenya subcounties.
In Alego, we compiled a list of rural villages eligible for GD expansion. We then grouped
sublocations into 23 saturation groups, ensuring that each saturation group was formed
from contiguous sublocations, had at least three study villages, and (where possible) the
number of study villages was a multiple of three (given that either one-third or two-thirds of
villages are assigned to treatment within each sublocation). In 11 sublocations, we declared
the sublocation itself as the saturation group. The remaining 13 saturation groups were
formed by combining contiguous sublocations into saturation groups. In this manner, the 39
sublocations in Alego were allocated to 23 saturation groups, which were later randomized
into high- and low-saturation status.
GD had worked in 193 villages in Alego prior to the start of this study. To account for
previous participation in GD’s program, we stratified assignment of high and low saturation
by the level of previous exposure to the GD program within the saturation group, measured
as the share of villages covered by a previous GD campaign, splitting the exposure level at
the median.
We then randomly assigned villages to three groups, and randomly assigned these groups
to either a) treatment, b) treatment in high saturation, control in low saturation, and c)
control. In Alego, 12 saturation groups were assigned to high saturation status, covering 98
villages (65 treatment, 33 control), and 11 saturation groups were assigned to low saturation
status, covering 105 villages (37 treatment, 68 control). Across these 203 villages, a total of
7,891 households were classified as eligible by the GE census team (37 percent of households),
with 3,950 of these households in treatment villages. We randomly generated an order for
GD program expansion by first randomly ordering the saturation groups, and then villages
within saturation groups.
The second randomization batch included villages in Ugunja and Ugenya subcounties.
GD had not previously worked in any villages in these subcounties, so we did not stratify
on any variables related to previous exposure for these villages. These subcounties had a
larger number of villages per sublocation than Alego on average; as a result, we randomized
saturation at the sublocation level. We assigned villages to one of three groups as above,
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pooled the “residual” villages that were not a multiple of 3, and randomly assigned one
third of these to treatment, one third to treatment in high saturation sublocations and
control in low saturation sublocations, and one third to control. GD worked first in Ugunja
and then Ugenya. Across Ugunja and Ugenya, 115 sublocations covering 227 villages (148
treatment, 79 control) were assigned to high saturation status, while 79 sublocations covering
224 villages (78 treatment, 146 control) were assigned to low saturation status. These 450
villages had a total of 13,846 households classified as eligible by the GE census team (31
percent), with 7,105 of these households in treatment villages. We generated a random
order within these subcounties by first ordering locations (the administrative unit above the
sublocation), then sublocations within the location, then villages within the sublocation.
B.3 Illustrating spatial variation in treatment
Figure B.1: Spatial variation of data and treatment
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Households
! Eligible
! Ineligible
# Non-farm Enterprise
2 km Buffer
^ Market
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.80.1 km
Notes: This figure provides an example of the spatial variation that we use to identify spillover effects. Both panels provide
zoomed-in views on a selection of villages from Figure 2. Panel A illustrates variation in the density of treatment villages
around 2 treated villages. It plots village centers for treatment (filled circles) and control (open circles) villages, as well as a 2
km radius around the village center. While both villages themselves are not treated, the share of treated villages around them
varies considerably. Panel B zooms in on one of these villages and plots eligible and ineligible households, as well as non-farm
enterprises. Market centers are plotted as red stars.
We construct the amount per capita GDP in each buffer around a village or market i
( ˜Amtits) as the per capita transfers in each buffer, divided by per capita GDP. We obtain
amount transferred into each buffer r at time s from the GPS location of recipients, as well
as information from GiveDirectly (GD) on transfers sent to each recipient. Per capita GDP
is calculated as the population-weighted average, across all households in the study area, of
our expenditure-based measure of GDP (see Section 4). To convert stock values into annual
flows, we assume a 10% depreciation rate. This yields an average per capita GDP of USD
640 PPP. For ˜Amt v,its, we exclude households in the same village.
The population in each radius band around each market or village is determined using
the GPS location of each household in our baseline household census data. Each household is
B-3
then multiplied by the average number of people per household from the baseline household
survey. This provides a population measure across each village in our study sample. To
account for villages not included in our sample, but within radii bands of study markets,
we take two approaches. First, in villages that were not part of our sample but where
GD had worked previously, we use household GPS locations provided to us by GD. For
areas which were neither in our sample nor had been visited by GD previously, we calculate
the population by uniformly distributing the sublocation population from the 2009 Kenyan
census (inflated by the overall average population growth rate in Kenya between 2009 and
2014 and net of the population in villages that our field team or GiveDirectly had collected
GPS data for) over the area of the sublocation that was not already covered by a village in
our study or a village where GD had worked previously.
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C Household data appendix
C.1 Construction of index outcomes
Our index variables are constructed from the following components:
1. Psychological well-being index: Weighted, standardized average of depression (10 ques-
tion CES-D scale), happiness, life satisfaction, and perceived stress (PSS-4), appropri-
ately signed so that positive values represent better psychological well-being.
2. Health index: weighted, standardized average of self-reported health (on a scale of 1 to
5), an index of indicators for common health indicators, and an indicator for whether
the respondent has experienced a major health problem since the date of baseline
surveys, appropriately signed so that positive values represent better health.
3. Food security index: weighted, standardized index of the number of days a) adults and
b) children i) skipped or cut meals, ii) went to bed hungry, iii) went entire days without
food out of the last 7 days, appropriately signed so that higher values represent better
food security. The Children food security index is made up of the child-related food
security questions.
4. Education index: weighted, standardized average of total education expenditure and
proportion of school-aged children in school, appropriately signed so that higher values
represent better education outcomes.
5. Female empowerment index: weighted, standardized average of a violence index and
attitudes index, appropriately signed so that positive values reflect more female empow-
erment/less domestic violence. The violence index is calculated as from the frequency
of physical, emotional as sexual violence over the last 6 months. The attitudes index is
calculated from an index of male-oriented attitudes and an index on the justifiability
of domestic violence.
6. Security index: a weighted, standardized index of the number of times victimized
by i) theft or ii) assault, arson or witchcraft in the last 12 months, an indicator for
experiencing but not reporting a crime, and an indicator for reporting to be worried
about crime or safety in the neighborhood.
C.2 Tracking and attrition
We achieved high tracking rates at endline, reaching over 90 percent of both treatment and
control households. To assess levels of attrition, and whether attrition at endline is affected
by treatment status and hence might confound our results, we estimate Equation (1) using as
an outcome an indicator for whether household h in village v in sublocation s is observed at
endline, and do this separately for eligible and ineligible households. We investigate whether
this indicator of non-attrition varies with treatment status in Table C.1. We observe high
tracking rates of 90.3 and 90.8 in the two types of households, respectively, in low-saturation
control villages. These rates are very similar in other villages and sublocations: We observe
broadly insignificant treatment coefficients in both tables, suggesting that attrition does
C-1
not systematically vary with treatment status. This result is robust to defining rhvs as an
indicator for being reached at both baseline and endline (Column 2). It is also robust to
restricting the sample to only households reached at endline (Panel B) or only households
surveyed at baseline (Panel C). The one significant coefficient is for ineligible households in
high-saturation sublocations: these are significantly less likely to be reached twice (Panel A,
Column 4).
Table C.1: Household survey tracking and attrition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible Ineligible
Surveyed at
endline
Surveyed at baseline
and endline
Surveyed at
endline
Surveyed at baseline
and endline
Panel A: All households targeted at endline
Treatment Village 0.004 0.003 0.011 0.015
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
High Saturation Sublocation 0.002 −0.011 −0.014 −0.033˚˚
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
Control, Low Sat Mean (SD) 0.892 0.797 0.901 0.800
(0.311) (0.403) (0.299) (0.400)
Observations 6,039 6,039 3,111 3,111
Panel B: Among households surveyed at endline
Treatment Village −0.001 0.006
(0.010) (0.014)
High Saturation Sublocation −0.014 −0.023˚
(0.010) (0.014)
Control, Low Sat Mean (SD) 0.894 0.889
(0.309) (0.315)
Observations 5,423 2,816
Panel C: Among households surveyed at baseline
Treatment Village −0.005 −0.005 0.011 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
High Saturation Sublocation 0.003 0.003 −0.019˚ −0.019˚
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Control, Low Sat Mean (SD) 0.916 0.916 0.929 0.929
(0.278) (0.278) (0.256) (0.256)
Observations 5,197 5,197 2,651 2,651
Notes: This table reports tracking and attrition rates for households, by classification as eligible or ineligible to receive GD
transfers by GE project field staff. Panel A includes all eligible households that were targeted for endline sureys. Panel B
looks at eligible households that completed endline surveys, and serves as our main analysis sample. Panel C looks at eligible
households that completed baseline surveys, and provides information on households that attrited from baseline to endline.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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C.3 Baseline balance
To test whether there are differences in baseline characteristics across treatment arms for
respondents observed at endline, we estimate the following model:
pXhvs,t“0|rhvs “ 1q “ β0 ` β1Tvs ` β2Hs ` εhvs (13)
Tvs is an indicator for households residing in a treated village. Hs is an indicator for
living in a high-saturation sublocation, which we control for as it was part of the research
design; however, our focus is on β1. Table C.2 presents results. In Columns (2) and (4) we
report baseline differences between eligible and ineligible households in treatment and control
villages for a number of variables. We observe insignificant differences for most variables,
with the exception of an indicator for scoring above the median scores on a psychological
well-being index, which on average is higher in eventually treated villages at baseline, both
among eligible and ineligible households. Ineligible households in treated villages also have
a significantly higher food security index at baseline, are more likely to have children in the
household, and are less likely to be employed (the latter two differences being significant at
the 10 percent level).
Table C.2: Household balance
Eligibles Ineligibles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control, Low Sat
Mean (SD)
Treatment
Effect
N
Control, Low Sat
Mean (SD)
Treatment
Effect
N
Female 0.67 0.01 4,768 0.79 −0.02 2,458
(0.47) (0.02) (0.41) (0.02)
Respondent aged 25 or older 0.83 0.01 4,755 0.97 −0.01 2,448
(0.38) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01)
Is married 0.64 0.02 4,768 0.42 0.03 2,458
(0.48) (0.01) (0.49) (0.02)
Completed primary school 0.41 0.01 4,768 0.29 0.02 2,458
(0.49) (0.02) (0.45) (0.02)
Has child 0.80 0.01 4,768 0.68 0.04˚ 2,458
(0.40) (0.01) (0.47) (0.02)
Self-employed 0.27 0.00 4,768 0.28 0.01 2,458
(0.45) (0.01) (0.45) (0.02)
Employed in wage work 0.36 −0.03 4,768 0.21 −0.03˚ 2,458
(0.48) (0.02) (0.41) (0.02)
Total non-land, non-home assets, net loans (z-scored) (USD) −0.18 0.01 4,768 0.41 0.08 2,458
(0.65) (0.02) (1.36) (0.06)
Total household income in the last 12 months (z-scored) (USD) 0.01 0.01 4,768 0.07 0.02 2,458
(0.89) (0.03) (1.02) (0.05)
Total business revenue in the last 12 months (z-scored) (USD) −0.08 0.03 4,768 0.13 0.05 2,458
(0.75) (0.03) (1.20) (0.06)
Psychological wellbeing index 0.00 0.06˚ 4,765 0.00 0.08˚ 2,458
(0.99) (0.04) (0.99) (0.05)
Food security index −0.01 0.00 4,768 −0.01 0.09˚˚ 2,458
(1.00) (0.03) (1.01) (0.04)
Notes: Differences in baseline outcomes between households in treatment and control villages. Column (2) shows the baseline difference between eligible households in
treated and untreated villages, and Column (5) shows the same difference for ineligible households. Columns (1) and (4) show the respective control means and standard
deviations. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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D Enterprise data appendix
Table D.1: Composition of enterprises by sector
Overall Non-Ag
Sector Count Share Revenue Share Count Share Revenue Share
Retail 0.09 0.34 0.54 0.52
Manufacturing 0.04 0.16 0.25 0.24
Services 0.03 0.16 0.21 0.24
Agriculture 0.84 0.35
Notes: This table describes enterprise shares by sector, both in terms of counts and shares of
total revenue. Data on counts comes from the endline enterprise census (for non-agricultural
enterprises) and the baseline household census (agricultural enterprises). Data on revenue shares
for non-agricultural sector comes from endline enterprise surveys, while data on agricultural
revenue shares comes from endline household surveys.
D.1 Enterprise specifications
We estimate the following equations for enterprises:
yivs “ α1Treatv ¨Xivs ` α2HighSats ¨Xivs `Xivsγ ` δ1yivs,t“0 ¨Xivs ` δ2Mivs ¨Xivs ` εivs,
(14)
yiv “ α ` βAmtv ¨Xivs `
Rÿ
r“0
βrAmt v,r ¨Xivs `Xivsγ ` δ1yiv,t“0 ¨Xivs ` δ2Miv ¨Xivs ` εiv.
(15)
Here, yivs is an outcome for enterprise i in village v (and sublocation s), Xivpsq is a vector of
indicators for enterprise type (agricultural, nonagricultural operating outside the homestead,
nonagricultural operating from the homestead), and other terms are defined as in Section 2.
We interact our treatment and amount variables with this vector of enterprise types.
D.2 Matching enterprise owners
We make use of both automatic and manual matching procedures using our detailed name,
phone number and GPS data in order to match enterprise owners to households. As we relied
heavily on the reported operating location, we excluded enterprise census data without this
information.
The proportion of matched enterprises are relatively evenly split by treatment status for
both eligible and ineligible households: 52% of matched eligible enterprise owners and 51%
of matched ineligible owners are in treatment villages.
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D.3 Tracking, balance and attrition
Our enterprise surveys are analyzed as repeated cross-sections, so we do not report attrition
rates between baseline and endline for enterprises. We do check baseline balances for enter-
prises, using an enterprise-level version of Equation (13), and report results in Table D.2.
We do not find statistically significant results for most outcomes, though enterprise costs are
marginally significantly higher for enterprises in high saturation sublocations at baseline.
Table D.2: Enterprise Balance
(1) (2) (3)
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
1pHigh Saturationq
Reduced form
Control, low saturation
weighted mean (SD)
Panel A: All enterprises
Enterprise profits, annualized −15.46 10.41 374.87
(20.32) (20.05) (638.34)
Enterprise revenue, annualized −95.42 110.25 747.54
(89.03) (87.68) (3,651.18)
Enterprise costs, annualized 3.77 2.13 57.09
(6.05) (5.98) (236.95)
Enterprise wagebill, annualized 3.36 2.41 53.01
(5.90) (5.84) (232.87)
Enterprise profit margin 0.02 −0.04 0.50
(0.02) (0.02) (0.38)
Panel B: Village-level
Number of enterprises 0.00 0.01 1.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.14)
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients on an indicator for treatment village and an indicator for saturation
status of the sublocation from a regression of each outcome at baseline on these indicators. We stack 3 separate
regressions for own-farm enterprises, non-agricultural enterprises operated within the household, and non-agricultural
enterprises operated outside the household, due to our independent sampling across these enterprise categories. Each
regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights. For monetary values, we convert effects to a per-household level by
multiplying the average effect in each enterprise category by the number of enterprises in that category, dividing by the
number of households in our study area, and summing over all enterprise categories. For the number of enterprises, we
run regressions at the village level, where the outcome is the number of enterprises per household in each category, we
weight by the number of households in each village and sum up over all enterprise categories. For the profit margin, we
weight the effects across all enterprise categories by their share in the economy, and across each enterprise by revenue,
so that our estimate represents the effect on the revenue-weighted average enterprise in the economy. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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E Price data appendix
E.1 Categorizing market survey products
Table E.1: List of market products by category
Non-Traded (locally produced) Traded
Food Livestock Non-Food Non-Durables Durables Temptation Goods
Cassava Pineapple Bull (local) Bar soap 1 Iron sheet (32 gauge) Cigarettes
Irish potato Water Melon Calf (local) Toothpaste Cement Alcohol
Maize Jackfruit Chicken (hen) Vaseline/lotion Large Padlock
Millet Passion Fruit Goat Washing powder Nails (3 inch)
Plantains Beef Sheep Bleach Roofing Nails
Rice Fish (Tilapia) Bull (grade) Panadol/aspirin Timber (2x2)
Sorghum Goat (meat) Calf (grade) Cooking fat Water Paint
Sweet potato Pork Donkey Batteries (3-volt) 20L Jerry can
Beans Eggs Turkey Firewood Thermos flask
Cabbage Milk (Fresh) Duck Kerosene 3 1/2 X 6 Mattress
Cowpea leaves Biscuits Charcoal Bicycle (local)
Green grams Bread Leso Mosquito Net
Groundnuts Cake Small sufuria
Kales Maize flour Slippers
Onions Wheat flour Fertilizer
Saka (Local Vegetable) Milk (Fermented) Improved seed (maize)
Tomatoes Milk powder
Avocado Soda
Banana-sweet Sugar
Mango Tea
Orange Lamb (meat)
Papaya
E.2 Enterprise price analyses
In addition to prices collected as part of our market price surveys, we also collected some
price data as part of our enterprise surveys. We make use of enterprise price data collected
via seven rounds of phone surveys of enterprises between August 2015 and June 2016. These
surveys were conducted with four types of enterprises: small retailers, maize grinders, hard-
ware stores, and tailors. We focus on maize grinding and tailoring prices, since hardware
and retail prices are extensively covered in our market price data. We collected the price of
grinding 1kg of maize at a posho mill, and for patching a small hole at a tailor shop. An
advantage of the enterprise price data is that it allows us to look at prices other than the
list of products contained in our market surveys, such as local manufacturing and services.
However, we have a much more limited set of products, as we selected a small number of
items to try to ensure consistent quality, quantities and availability.
Phone surveys overlapped with an intense period of treatment rollout. During those
11 months the share of overall transfers sent went from 52% to 92%, and the variation in
transfers was substantial, both across space and time: The 10-90 percentile range of per
capita GDP transferred within 2km of a village over the period is r0.5%, 9.6%s, and the
average village experienced 1.8% of GDP more inflows in the most intense month compared
to the least intense month.
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We analyze these prices analogously to our market prices, running the following specifi-
cation:
pevt “
ÿ
rPR¯
Mÿ
l“0
βrl ˜Amtvpt´lqr ` αv ` λt ` εevt (16)
where pevt is the logarithm of the price from enterprise e in village v in month t, αv are
village fixed effects, γt are month fixed effects. We select the included radii bands R¯ and
the number of treatment lags M using the same pre-specified algorithm as for market prices.
Table E.2 reports the average treatment effect across the intervention period (ATE) as well
as the average maximum effect across villages (AME) from the optimal specification, and
investigates heterogeneity by market access (see Section 2.7 for details on the methodology).
We find limited effects on these two selected products, with magnitudes in the range of
product-specific effects for our our market price measures. Tailoring prices rise by 0.1% on
average, and 0.5% in the month of most intense transfer, though those coefficients are not
statistically significant. As with market prices, the effects are concentrated in more remote
areas, with average price inflation of 0.6% in villages below median market access (significant
at the 10% level). Maize grinding prices fall, if anything, but the estimated effects are not
statistically significantly different from zero.
Table E.2: Local manufacturing and services prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Effects (in %) ATE by market access (in %)
ATE
Average maximum
effect (AME) below median above median
Tailor, patch small hole 0.09 0.52 0.62˚ −0.25
(0.36) (1.99) (0.34) (0.50)
Posho mill, grind 1kg of maize −0.15 −0.85 −0.29 −0.12
(0.18) (1.00) (0.28) (0.13)
Notes: Each row represents a regression of the logarithm of a price (multiplied by 100) on the “optimal” number of lags
and distance buffers of per capita Give Directly transfers in each buffer. We include 2,347 monthly price observations for
tailors (simple platch), and 4,577 observations from posho mills (grinding 1kg of maize) collected between Aug 15 - Jun
16, around the time of peak transfer intensity. The number of radii bands and lags is chosen sequentially by minimizing
the BIC, as pre-specified. Regressions include a full set of market and month fixed effects. Column 1 reports the implied
ATE, calculated by evaluating the “optimal” regression specification at the average level of treatment intensity between
September 2014 and March 2017, the time during which transfers went out. Column 2 reports the average maximum
effect, calculated at the average across all markets of the month in which the largest per capita transfers went into a
market’s neighborhood (up to the largest buffer selected by the algorithm). Columns 3 and 4 break down the ATE by
market access, defined as MAm “ ř10r“0 r´θNr, where θ “ 8 and Nr is the population in in the r ´ 2 to r km buffer
around each market. Regressions are weighted by inverse sampling weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are as in
Conley (1999, 2008) and we allow for spatial correlation up to 10km and autocorrelation up to 3 months. * denotes
significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
E-2
F Fiscal multiplier - robustness
Table F.1 presents the full detail of our main multiplier estimates. In this section, we conduct
two main robustness checks. First, we exclude the first 3 quarters from our integral because
we do not observe most households in the first 9 months after the first transfer. Second, we
use a combination of household expenditure data, enterprise data and conservative assump-
tions on import shares by type of enterprise to provide an (upper) estimate of the share of
the expenditure multiplier that may reflect increased imports from outside the study area.
F.1 Excluding initial expenditure and income responses
Figure 1 illustrates that endline household surveys started around 12 months after the first
transfer was scheduled in each village, while enterprise endline surveys started around 18
months out. Recall periods for consumption expenditures depend on the frequency of pur-
chase in each category, but are weekly or monthly for the bulk of expenditure. For enterprise
outcomes, recall is monthly. Consequently, we do not observe much of the expenditure and
income flows in the first 3 quarters after the initial transfer. In our empirical analysis, we
treat each dollar spent symmetrically, regardless of whether it is the first, second or third
tranche. Since transfers roll our across households, and are scheduled in months 0, 2 and
8 after the experimental start date for each recipient, we are still able to estimate impacts
for the first 3 quarters, but with much less precision than for later quarters due to much
smaller variation in treatment intensity (this becomes obvious in figure 3). Note that this is
less of an issue for across-village spillovers, since some neighboring villages may have been
randomly treated later, so that transfers are flowing in closer to the time we observe a given
household or enterprise.
From a perspective of minimizing the mean squared error, it may therefore be preferable
to exclude the noisily estimated initial quarters. This incurs a downward-bias, but may
increase precision. Table F.2 presents the results of this exercise. As expected, estimates are
lower compared to our main specification at 1.97, while standard errors decline significantly.
In fact, the p-values for our tests of a multiplier less than zero and less than one decrease
despite lower coefficients. When testing both multipliers jointly, we reject a multiplier smaller
than one with a p-value of 0.04.
F.2 Accounting for imports of intermediate goods
As described in section 4, our expenditure multiplier incorrectly includes imports which are
not part of local value added. From household shopping patterns, we know that only 10%
of households report ever shopping at a market outside our study area. Non-farm businesses
report only 5% of customers coming from outside the study area. In addition, our estimated
effects on household consumption and enterprise revenue are fairly similar, suggesting that
consumer spending was quite localized and direct imports by households are small. Our
main concern is therefore imported intermediate goods.
To gauge whether this bias is quantitatively important, we first assign each component
of our expenditure and asset measures to one of 48 enterprise types where it is most likely
purchased. When there are multiple possible types of enterprises, we use overall revenue
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Table F.1: Fiscal Multiplier Estimates: Detailed Component Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
M
Estimate
H0: M ă 0
p-value
H0: M ă 1
p-value
Panel A: Expenditure multiplier 2.53 0.05˚ 0.17
(1.55)
Household consumption 1.55 0.16 0.37
(1.47)
Household assets 0.42 0.00˚˚˚ 1.00
(0.04)
Enterprise investment 0.47 0.14 0.87
(0.44)
Enterprise inventory 0.08 0.02˚˚ 1.00
(0.04)
Panel B: Income multiplier 2.81 0.07˚ 0.18
(1.90)
Household wage bill 1.00 0.23 0.51
(1.26)
Enterprise profits 1.68 0.12 0.31
(1.37)
Enterprise capital income 0.09 0.32 1.00
(0.18)
Enterprise taxes paid 0.04 0.11 1.00
(0.03)
Average of both multipliers 2.67 0.04˚˚ 0.14
(1.52)
Joint test of both multipliers 0.02˚˚ 0.07˚
Notes: Results from joint estimation of expenditure and income multipliers using data
starting four quarters after the distribution of transfers. Column (1) reports point estimates
of both multipliers and their respective components. Each component is estimated individ-
ually and the multiplier is obtained by aggregating components as described in the main
text. Effects of the cash infusion on flow variables (consumption, investment, wages, profits,
capital income, and taxes) are obtained by dynamically estimating effect sizes over the first
29 months after the first transfer and computing the integral under this curve. Effects on
remaining stock variables are approximated by the total endline treatment effect. Standard
errors are computed by 2,000 replications of a wild clustered bootstrap technique, which
re-allocates within-sublocation perturbed residuals from the main population regressions to
fitted outcome values to create perturbed samples. Columns (2) and (3) conduct one-sided
tests of each estimate by counting the number of times the wild bootstrap produced an
estimate complying with the null hypotheses and compute p-values as the fraction the null
was satisfied. Finally, the last row reports p-values from joint tests against the same nulls,
following an identical procedure. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at
1 pct. level.
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Table F.2: Fiscal Multiplier Estimates: Quarter 4 and onwards
(1) (2) (3)
M
Estimate
H0: M ă 0
p-value
H0: M ă 1
p-value
Panel A: Expenditure multiplier 1.97 0.00˚˚˚ 0.09˚
(0.72)
Household consumption 1.22 0.04˚˚ 0.38
(0.68)
Household assets 0.42 0.00˚˚˚ 1.00
(0.04)
Enterprise investment 0.25 0.06˚ 1.00
(0.16)
Enterprise inventory 0.08 0.02˚˚ 1.00
(0.04)
Panel B: Income multiplier 1.77 0.01˚˚˚ 0.16
(0.75)
Household wage bill 1.52 0.01˚˚˚ 0.21
(0.61)
Enterprise profits 0.10 0.41 0.99
(0.41)
Enterprise capital income 0.13 0.06˚ 1.00
(0.09)
Enterprise taxes paid 0.01 0.03˚˚ 1.00
(0.01)
Average of both multipliers 1.87 0.00˚˚˚ 0.09˚
(0.64)
Joint test of both multipliers 0.00˚˚˚ 0.04˚˚
Notes: Results from joint estimation of expenditure and income multipliers using data
starting four quarters after the distribution of transfers. Column (1) reports point estimates
of both multipliers and their respective components. Each component is estimated individ-
ually and the multiplier is obtained by aggregating components as described in the main
text. Effects of the cash infusion on flow variables (consumption, investment, wages, profits,
capital income, and taxes) are obtained by dynamically estimating effect sizes over the first
29 months after the first transfer and computing the integral under this curve. Effects on
remaining stock variables are approximated by the total endline treatment effect. Standard
errors are computed by 2,000 replications of a wild clustered bootstrap technique, which
re-allocates within-sublocation perturbed residuals from the main population regressions to
fitted outcome values to create perturbed samples. Columns (2) and (3) conduct one-sided
tests of each estimate by counting the number of times the wild bootstrap produced an
estimate complying with the null hypotheses and compute p-values as the fraction the null
was satisfied. Finally, the last row reports p-values from joint tests against the same nulls,
following an identical procedure. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at
1 pct. level.
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shares of different enterprise types to distribute expenditure between them. Reassuringly, our
correspondence implies expenditure shares by enterprise type that match their revenue shares
from the enterprise survey fairly well (correlation coefficient of 0.75). For each enterprise
type, we then obtain an upper-bound for the share of intermediate inputs in overall value
added as: 1 ´ 1
N
ř
i
costi`profiti
revenuei
(where we first winsorize at the 1% and 99% cut-offs, then
average across enterprises of each type using revenue weights, and cap at 0 and 1). This is an
upper bound, because our cost measure only contains selected components of costs. Next,
we make assumptions, based on our understanding of the local context, about what share
of intermediate inputs is imported from outside the study area. In doing so, we try to err
on the side of an import share that is too high. The total share of imports in consumption
expenditure and assets is then calculated as the expenditure-weighted share of imports of
intermediate goods for each expenditure and asset category (for an exact correspondence
between each consumption good / asset and enterprise types, consult the supplemental
appendix).
Using this methodology, our upper-range estimate of the share of imports in consumption
is 19%. For assets, the figure is 24%. While this shows that imports of intermediate goods
are non-negligible, a large majority of spending still reflects local economic activity. To get
a sense of how this impacts our multiplier estimate, we further assume that a) inventories
are in terms of intermediate goods rather than final goods (leading us to err on the side
of overstating their import share, at 35%), b) the import share of enterprise investment is
the same as that of household assets (in our context, household and enterprise assets are
often comparable or even shared), and c) imports scale linearly with expenditure. We then
compute the share of our expenditure-based multiplier that is spent locally (see table F.3).
Even with our conservative assumptions, the fiscal multiplier for local expenditure remains
at 2.00.
Table F.3: Fiscal Multiplier Estimates: Adjusting for Imported Intermediates
(1) (2) (3)
CTM
Estimate
Share
imported
Import
adjusted
Expenditure multiplier 2.53 0.21 2.00
Household consumption 1.55 0.19 1.26
Household assets 0.42 0.24 0.32
Enterprise investment 0.47 0.24 0.36
Enterprise inventory 0.08 0.35 0.05
Notes: Results from joint estimation of the expenditure multiplier (as in
Table 5). Column (1) reports our preferred point estimates of the expen-
diture multiplier components. Each component is estimated individually
and the multiplier is obtained by aggregating components as described
in the main text. Column (2) presents our upper-range estimates of the
share of imports captures for each expenditure component, and column
(3) presents the import-share adjusted estimate of the multiplier on local
expenditure only.
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G Study pre-analysis plans
We filed a series of pre-analysis plans as part of this study. These include: i) Haushofer
et al. (2017a), and a follow-up amendment outlining spillover analyses, both of which focus
on household outcomes; ii) Haushofer et al. (2016), which covered midline market price and
enterprise data; and iii) Haushofer et al. (2018), which focused on macroeconomic quantities
of interest.44. In this paper, we focus on primary outcomes for households, enterprises and
prices, collected as part of our baseline and endline household and enterprise censuses and
surveys, as well as our midline market price surveys.
Less relevant to this paper are: i) Walker (2017), which forms the basis of Walker (2018)
on local taxes and public goods; and ii) Haushofer et al. (2017b), which conducts a separate
exercise to study potential transfer targeting.
In the interest of space, we do not present an exhaustive list of every outcome component
and analysis mentioned across these pre-analysis plans. A supplemental appendix containing
the full set of pre-specified outcomes for these plans is available upon request.
Table G.1 presents the 10 primary household outcomes that we pre-specified as part
of a single table, including FDR q-values accounting for multiple testing across these ten
outcomes. In addition to the specifications reported in the main tables, we also report the
pooled saturation effect, the average effect of being in a high saturation sublocation across
all eligibility and village types. As outlined in Section 2, we prefer our spatial estimates as
they take advantage of the full variation in treatment intensity in our data, but present these
saturation results for completeness.
To calculate the pooled saturation effect, we use coefficient estimates from the following
equation:
yhvs,t“1 “ β0 ` β1Tvs ` β2Ehvs ` β3Hs ` β4Tvs ˆ Ehvs ` β5Tvs ˆHs (17)
` β6Ehvs ˆHs ` β7Tvs ˆ Ehvs ˆHs ` δ1yhvs,t“0 ` δ2Mhvs ` εihvs. (18)
Here, h indexes the household, v indexes the village, s indexes the sublocation, and t in-
dicates whether the variable was measured at baseline or endline. Tvs is an indicator for
households residing in a treated village, Ehvs is an indicator for whether the household is
eligible for transfers, and Hs is an indicator for living in a high-saturation sublocation; ˆ
denote interaction terms. Standard errors are clustered at the saturation group level. The
pooled saturation effect is then a weighted average of β3, β5, β6 and β7.
We make two additional notes. First, in Haushofer et al. (2016), we were not clear
whether we would focus on a balanced panel of market survey data or an unbalanced panel.
For simplicity, we present results using a balanced panel, but results are robust to using an
unbalanced panel. Second, our reduced form equations cluster standard errors at the village
level, as pre-specified in Haushofer et al. (2017a), but results are also robust to clustering at
the sublocation level. (Both sets of results are available upon request).
44. All can be accessed on the AEA trial registry: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/
505.
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Table G.1: Pre-specified primary outcomes, household welfare plan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated Households Untreated Households
1pTreat villageq
Reduced form
Total Effect
IV
Total Effect
IV
Pooled saturation
effect
Control, low saturation
mean (SD)
Assets (non-land, non-house), net borrowing 178.47˚˚˚ 174.10˚˚˚ 132.63˚ 42.06 1,132.15
(24.63) (47.09) (78.31) (42.33) (1,420.22)
[0.00]˚˚˚ [0.00]˚˚˚ [0.22] [0.48]
Household expenditure, annualized 292.98˚˚˚ 343.34˚˚˚ 333.66˚˚˚ 138.26˚ 2,536.86
(60.09) (112.02) (123.22) (71.29) (1,934.09)
[0.00]˚˚˚ [0.01]˚˚˚ [0.05]˚ [0.27]
Household income, annualized 77.62˚ 131.48 229.42˚˚˚ 111.85˚ 1,023.45
(43.66) (100.78) (88.58) (59.47) (1,634.70)
[0.07]˚ [0.19] [0.05]˚ [0.27]
Household revenue, annualized 73.62 170.31˚ 54.31 117.04˚˚ 933.27
(51.59) (97.34) (109.18) (57.86) (1,698.65)
[0.12] [0.15] [0.38] [0.27]
Psychological well-being index 0.09˚˚˚ 0.12˚ 0.08 0.04 0.01
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (1.01)
[0.01]˚˚ [0.15] [0.27] [0.27]
Health index 0.04 0.06 0.01 −0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (1.01)
[0.14] [0.28] [0.41] [1.00]
Education index 0.09˚˚ 0.10˚ 0.10˚ 0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (1.02)
[0.02]˚˚ [0.15] [0.22] [0.50]
Female empowerment index −0.01 −0.13 0.09 0.02 0.05
(0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.08) (0.94)
[0.35] [0.28] [0.37] [1.00]
Food security index 0.10˚˚˚ 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03) (1.00)
[0.01]˚˚˚ [0.25] [0.26] [1.00]
Hours worked last week (respondent) 1.27 −1.18 −1.79 1.05 34.05
(1.02) (1.93) (1.41) (0.95) (27.11)
[0.14] [0.37] [0.29] [0.48]
Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficient on an indicator for treatment village from a regression using data from eligible households (as classified by the GE census team), and includes an
indicator for saturation status of the sublocation. Column 2 reports the total effect on treated households (eligible recipients) from the “optimal” IV spatial regression of each outcome
on the amount transferred per capita to a household’s own village v (instrumented by village treatment status), and to villages other than v in each 2km radii band around the household
(instrumented by the share of eligible households assigned to treatment in villages other than v inside the buffer). For this analysis, the sample is restricted to eligible households.
Column 3 presents the average spillover effect on eligible households in control villages as well as ineligible households, coming from a stacked spatial regression of each outcome on the
amount transferred per capita GDP to each 2km radii band around each household (instrumented by the share of eligibles assigned to treatment in each buffer). The reported average
effect comes from a population-share-weighted average effect experienced by those two groups, and is representative of the average untreated household. The number of radii bands
included in columns 2 and 3 is chosen, as pre-specified, by minimizing the BIC. Column 4 reports the weighted mean and standard deviations of the outcome variables in low-saturation
control villages (across eligible and ineligible households). Each regression is weighted by inverse sampling weights and contains baseline values of the outcome when available. Standard
errors are clustered at the village in column 1, at the sublocation level in column 4, and calculated following Conley (1999), 2008 using a uniform kernel out to 10 km in columns 2 and
3. Minimum FDR q-values are reported in brackets. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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H Proofs
H.1 Derivation of Equation (11)
Assuming first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient for a solution, the envelope
theorem implies
dvi
dT
“ BuiBx´it ¨
Bx´it
BT ` λi
˜ 8ÿ
t“0
pδiqt
ˆByit
BT `
t
δi
Bδi
BT sit ´
Bpt
BT ¨ fpxitq
˙¸
(19)
where sit “ yit´pt ¨fpxitq is period t savings. In comparison, the welfare effect of a marginal
change in Ti holding other transfers fixed is simply
Bvi
BTi “ λi (20)
The expression for the (marginal) equivalent variation reported in the text is simply the
ratio of these expressions.
H.2 Derivation of Equation (12)
Differentiating the budget constraint,
dei
dT
“
ÿ
pδiqt
ˆByit
BT ´
Bpt
BT ¨ lit ´ pt ¨
Blit
BT `
t
δi
Bδi
BT pyit ´ pt ¨ litq
˙
(21)
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